VIOLENCE ON THE BRAIN: A CRITIQUE OF
NEUROSCIENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW
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Is there such a thing as a criminally "violent brain"? Does it
make sense to speak of "the neurobiology of violence" or the
"psychopathology of crime"? Is it possible to answer on a
physiological level what makes one person engage in criminal
violence and another not, under similarcircumstances?

Current research in law and neuroscience is promising to
answer these questions with a "yes." Some legal scholars
working in this area claim that we are close to realizing the
"early criminologists' dream of identifying the biological roots
of criminality."
These hopes for a neuroscientific
transformation of the criminal law, although based in the
newest research,are part of a very old story. Criminallaw and
neuroscience have been engaged in an ill-fated and sometimes
tragic affair for over two hundred years. Three issues have
recurred that track those that bedeviled earlierefforts to ground
criminal law in brain sciences. First is the claim that the brain
is often the most relevant or fundamental level at which to
understand criminal conduct. Second is that the various
phenomena we call "criminal violence" arise causally from
dysfunction within specific locations in the brain
("localization"). Third is the related claim that, because much
violent criminality arises from brain dysfunction, people who
commit such acts are biologically different from typical people
("alterity"or "otherizing").

This Article first demonstrates parallels between certain
current claims about the neurobiology of criminal violence and
past movements that were concerned with the law and
* Climenko Fellow & Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. I would like
to thank Yochai Benkler, Charles Barzun, I. Glenn Cohen, Owen Flanagan,
Oliver Goodenough, Anne Harrington, Owen Jones, Martha Minow and Alan
Stone for invaluable advice and comments on drafts. I am grateful as well for
the advice and comments of Drs. Stephan Chorover, Yoky Matsuoka, and Katja
Weich and to the members of the European Neuroscience & Society Network.
Luke Frankson and Julie Ruderman provided invaluable research assistance.

HeinOnline -- 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 183 2009

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

neuroscience of violence: phrenology, Lombrosian biological
criminology, and lobotomy. It then engages in a substantive
review and critique of several current claims about the
neurological bases of criminal violence. Drawing on research
and interviews with neuroscientists, this Article shows that
causally localizing what we call "criminal violence" to bits of
the brain is scientifically contestable and epistemologically
untenable.
In viewing the criminal law-neuroscience
relationship through the lens of history of science, this Article
hopes to offer a constructive portrait of how current
neuroscience might inform criminal law discourse about
regulating violence.

INTRODUCTION

Is there such a thing as a criminally "violent brain"? Does it
make sense to speak of "the neurobiology of violence"' or the
"psychopathology of crime"?2 Is it possible to answer on a
physiological level what makes one person engage in criminal
violence and another not, under similar circumstances?
Current research in law and neuroscience is promising to
answer these questions-and to answer each of them with a "yes."
Several scholars working in this area claim that we are "close[ ] to
realizing the early criminologists' dream of identifying the biological
roots of criminality. ,3 They urge not that some criminals suffer from
mental diseases but that "crime [is] a disease" 4 that the criminal law
should, across the board, "adopt a disease theory view of crime."'
This "disease" of violent crime does not arise from metaphorically
"sick" personal choices or social conditions; rather, some claim that
neuroscientists have discovered in criminal offenders a "'biological
brain-proneness' toward violence" that substantially explains the
existence
of violenthopeful
crime. 6 claims about the discovery of biological
The current,

1.

JAN VOLAVKA, NEUROBIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE

2 (1995).

2.

ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS
A CLINICAL DISORDER 3-4 (1993).

3. Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience
and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 56 (2006).
4. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors
and the Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L.
REV. 631, 730 (2004).
Kirchmeier's thesis is that neuroscience shows the
incoherence of notions of free will and, thus, that the criminal law should
substitute a "disease theory" for traditional notions of choice and blame. See id.
("[In the future our descendants will see crime the way we currently see
diseases.").
5. Id. at 728.
6. Redding, supra note 3, at 56 (quoting Nathaniel J. Pallone & James J.
Hennessy, Brain Dysfunction and Criminal Violence, SOCk, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at
22, 22).
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roots of criminality are part of a very old story. Criminal law and
neuroscience 7 have been engaged in an episodic and ill-fated love
affair for over two hundred years. In each era, it starts with bold
promises and a belief in the genuine mutual compatibility of the two
fields, but ends in disappointment and even tragedy. With every
resurgence in this mutual infatuation, lawmakers and scientists
swear that they will not make the same mistakes this timeprincipally because this time, science has finally matured.
The fraught
relationship between
criminal
law
and
neuroscience is worth re-examining now, in light of its history,
because we are at a moment of renewed infatuation. Indeed, we are
at the threshold of what some claim is no less than a neuroscientific
revolution within law that promises biologically-based explanations
of general features of human conduct." This new movement carries
forward some of the suspect epistemology of the prior movementsbut it also contains more real potential. A careful understanding of
the epistemic traps of the past and their relationship to certain
current ways of framing the brain-criminal law relationship will
help integrate neuroscience with law in ways that can enhance
specific doctrines within criminal law and evidence, although in a
more bounded fashion than some of the movement's strongest
proponents might claim.
Neuroscience evidence and principles have already begun to
find their way into criminal adjudications 9 and criminal law
7. The term "neuroscience" is of recent coinage and is anachronistic when
applied to the brain sciences of earlier eras; however, I use it throughout this
Article as a convenient umbrella term for both current and past scientific
investigations of human brain structure and function.
8. See, e.g., S. Zeki & O.R. Goodenough, Law and the Brain: Introduction,
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONs ROYAL Soc'y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1661, 1661
(2004) (calling development of neurolaw an all but "ineluctable consequence of
the current assault on the secrets of the brain").
9. To date, neuroscience evidence primarily has been offered by the
defense in mitigation at sentencing. See, e.g., Mosely v. Quarterman, No. 3:03CV-1577-N, 2008 WL 656887, at *18 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2008) (rejecting
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated on counsel's
failure to identify defendant's "frontal lobe impairment"); Mashburn v. State,
No. CR-06-0328, 2007 WL 3226600, at *11 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2007)
(reviewing capital sentence; holding that lower court appropriately weighed all
evidence in sentencing where it provided funds to defendant for MRI brain
evaluation and reviewed MRI findings indicating no structural brain
abnormalities); People v. Page, 186 P.3d 395, 413 (Cal. 2008) (discussing, in
appeal of capital sentence, defendant's proffer of MRI evidence showing cyst in
temporal lobe and numerous brain lesions); People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 98 (Cal.
2000) (describing introduction of PET scan as mitigating evidence showing
defendant's brain abnormalities); People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213, 231 (Cal. 1997)
(admitting PET and EEG scans as mitigating evidence in capital case); Rogers
v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 998-99 (Fla. 2001) (upholding trial court's grant of
funds for MRI brain scan for defendant's mitigation case); Hoskins v. State, 735
So. 2d 1281, 1281 (Fla. 1999) (vacating death sentence based on trial court's
failure to allow PET scan as mitigating evidence); United States v. Polizzi, 549
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scholarship."
This explosion of interest in neuroscience to
illuminate the (presumably universal) workings of the human mind
has spawned a host of neuro-fields-from neuroethics,"
neuroeconomics, 12131 and
neurohistory, 3
to
neurolaw 4
and
neurojurisprudence." Contributions to law from these emerging,
hybrid fields may be substantial. Neuroeconomics, in concert with
behavioral economics, is constructing more realistic and robust
F. Supp. 2d 308, 325-26 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (allowing admission at trial in child
pornography case MRI evidence of defendant's alleged brain abnormalities).
10. Since 2000 alone, over 200 articles have appeared in law reviews on the
subject of criminal law and neuroscience, ranging from neuroscience-based
explanations for the persistence of retributivism, see Morris B. Hoffman,
Rediscovering the Law's Moral Roots, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQuY 13, 14-15
(2008), to arguments for raising the age until which the criminal system will
treat an offender as a juvenile, see Richard F. Walsh, Raising the Age for
Juvenile Jurisdiction in Illinois: Medical Science, Adolescent Competency, and
Cost, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 767 (2008). A small sample of notable works in this
very broad area includes, for example, Martha J. Farah & Paul Root Wolpe,
Monitoring and ManipulatingBrain Function: New Neuroscience Technologies
and Their Ethical Implications, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 2004, at 35;
Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing
and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL
Sci. 1775 (2004); Morris B. Hoffman & Timothy H. Goldsmith, The Biological
Roots of Punishment, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 627 (2004); Stephen J. Morse,
Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to
Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J. L. ScI. & TECH. 1 (2008); 0. Carter
Snead, Neuroimagingand the "Complexity" of CapitalPunishment, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1265, 1287 (2007); Zeki & Goodenough, supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF
OUR MORAL DILEMMAS, at xv, xviii-xix (2006) (defining neuroethics as the study
of the relationship between ethical reasoning and in-built brain mechanisms or
patterns; arguing that there is a universal ethical template built into the brain);
cf. Mary Midgley, Do We Ever Really Act?, in THE NEW BRAIN SCIENCES: PERILS
AND PROSPECTS 17, 21-23 (Dai Rees & Steven Rose eds., 2004) (arguing that
while people self-evidently use their brains for ethical reasoning, the content of
ethical judgments is not biologically encoded into people's brains). Several
prominent universities have founded centers for neuroethics.
See, e.g.,
NEUROETHICS, http://neuroethics.upenn.edu (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). There is
also a widely-read Neuroethics & Law Blog. See Blog, Neuroethics & Law Blog,
http://kolber.typepad.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
12. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Neuroeconomic Path of the Law, 359
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1667 (2004); Paul
J. Zak, Neuroeconomics, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'Y LONDON B:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1737 (2004).
13. DANIEL LORD SMAIL, ON DEEP HISTORY AND THE BRAIN (2008) (arguing
that the field of history should be expanded to include "neurohistory"). Smail
contends, generally, that aspects of human prehistory can be divined from the
structure of, and inheritance evidenced by, our brains. Id.
14. Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007,
(Magazine) at 48 (coining "neurolaw" to describe uses of neuroscience in
lawmaking and in legal doctrine).
15. Redding, supra note 3, at 53 (arguing that the criminal law must
develop "neurojurisprudence" to account for knowledge being developed in the
brain and cognitive sciences).
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models of individual, group, and market behavior, with potentially
The
profound implications for the design of legal institutions.'
neuroimaging of pain may influence legal doctrines from tort and
disability to the death penalty and torture." And work on the
relationship between emotion and decision making may cause legal
scholars and philosophers to re-examine the relative importance of,
and relationships between, emotional and reason-based methods of
decision making. 8
Moving far beyond that, however, some important voices make
more imperialistic claims, arguing that we will be able to craft social
regimes built on "universal morals possessed by all members of our
species.., a brain-based philosophy of life." 19 It is the contention of
this Article that overreaching claims about the relationship between
individual neurobiology and criminal violence can undo the
productive contributions that neuroscience could otherwise make to
the criminal law. Because such claims exceed what the data show,
early legal adopters of more extreme forms of "neurolaw" could
create a backlash against neuroscience findings. Perhaps most
importantly, overreaching claims about the applicability of
neuroscience may lead to misapplications similar to those of prior
episodes of the criminal law-neuroscience story.
The central tenets of some current work on the criminal law and
neuroscience of violence are similar to those that underlay, and
ultimately undermined, past movements. This Article will argue
that these tenets, and the problems inherent in them, are:
16. Among many other fine works, see, for example, PAUL W. GLIMCHER,
DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF NEUROECONOMICS
(2003); Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1720 (2006) (applying cognitive and behavioral theories
of "optimal trust" to the design of legal institutions); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic
of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND
MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 33978 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005); Paul J. Zak, Neuroeconomics, in LAW AND
THE BRAIN 133-53 (Samir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006).
17. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective
Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 433-34 (2007) (arguing for use of
neuroimaging evidence of pain in litigation); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Seeing Pain,
Measuring Value(s): Neuroimaging Pain from Tort to Torture (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (collaborating with neuroscientists to explore
legal consequences of pain imaging). The notion of the chronic pain patient as
suffering from "conversion hysteria" or "accident neurosis" may be largely
undone by advances in identifying neural mechanisms of pain chronification,
putting to rest one of the last golems of Freudianism in the law. Hank Greely
and Stephen Morse also are exploring the relationship between pain
neurobiology and law in a forthcoming work.
18. See, e.g., Oliver R. Goodenough, Institutions, Emotions and Law: A
Goldilocks Problem for Mechanism Design (Vermont Law Sch. Berkman Ctr. for
Internet & Soc'y), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304190.
19. Michael S. Gazzaniga, Facts, Fictions, and the Future of Neuroethics, in
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, & POLICY 141, 141
(Judy Illes ed., 2006).
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" Because all behavior emerges from the brain, the individual

brain, in isolation, is the most relevant site for
understanding criminal behavior (this presents the problem
of levels of explanation);
" Because the brain is composed of specialized regions, criminal
behaviors like unlawful violence of all kinds must arise from
particular brain regions (this presents the compound
problem of reification and localization); and
" Because some people who commit violent crimes have brain
disorders, lawbreaking is best understood as the result of
disease or as a disease in itself (this is the problem of alterity
or "otherizing").
In viewing the criminal law-neuroscience relationship through the
lens of history of science, this Article hopes to offer both caveats and
a constructive portrait of how neuroscience might inform criminal
law discourse on regulating violence without recapitulating these
issues.
Part I of this Article, A History of Violence, examines three
movements in law and brain science that prefigure and inform
current efforts: phrenological studies of criminal behavior in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Cesare Lombroso's
"scientific" criminology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and psychointervention (lobotomy and electrode
implantation) arising against the backdrop of social turmoil of the
mid-twentieth century. In each of these subsections, I will show
how these disparate (although equally ill-fated) attempts to solve
the problem of violent crime through then-current brain sciences
evolved similarly: each started out with a precommitment to the
idea of the brain localization of violence, often based on studies
either of extreme human pathology or studies of animals with
substantially different evolutionary histories than humans. The
scientific and medical proponents of each had an express interest in
the social implications of their work and sought to reform or revise
criminal law through their work. And, legal scholars and criminal
law actors embraced and put into practice regimes based on the
work before an ultimate backlash shut them down.
The tragic shortcomings of the work of earlier eras now are
dismissed as unfortunate historical curiosities.2 ° This Part will
contend, however, that past efforts to invent a scientific criminal law
based on brain science foundered on many of the same shoals that
could undermine current neurolaw efforts; the history of these
20. Brent Garland & Mark S. Frankel, Considering Convergence: A Policy
Dialogue About Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience, and Law, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 109 (2006) (calling prior efforts to integrate brain
sciences with criminal law through, for example, phrenology and lobotomy,
"misguided" because they were based on "immature science").
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failures thus provides a highly relevant set of lessons.
Moving from historical to current efforts to ground criminal law
in brain science, Part II describes examples of current scholarship
on the neurobiology of violence. It presents arguments of influential
scholars that there is a deterministic relationship between violent
behavior and what they identify as brain dysfunction. Such scholars
embrace the view that the "mechanistically determined" brain
contains "the essential ingredients of the human condition."2'

This

Part also will examine causal claims made from neuroimaging
studies through examining an exemplary study on brain differences
between pedophiles and typical adults.
Because scholarship
described in this Part emphasizes the biology of individual brains
above other modes of explaining criminality, it emerges from the
tradition of reductionism in Western scientific and philosophical
thought. A full-scale critique of reductive individualism in legal
uses of brain sciences is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
this Part will set up the Article's consideration of the "practical,
technical, and epistemic concerns '22 posed by such brain-based
reductionism in criminal law.
Part III shows the formidable, perhaps insurmountable,
technical and epistemic hurdles to a purely, or primarily, brainbased view of violent crime. Critiquing current claims within legal
scholarship about the neurobiology of violence, it demonstrates the
major barriers to the causal localizability of violence to specific parts
of the brain (particularly, the prefrontal cortex2 3 and the
amygdala 24). This Part looks first at the state of knowledge in
neuroscience about the localizability of brain function generally,
starting with sensory-motor localization. It then presents the major
challenges that other neuroscientists have raised in relation to
attempts to localize higher cognitive functions and behaviors, like
"violence." Finally, it considers an in-principle barrier to reducing
violence entirely to brain operations: the role of law in defining what
is or is not "violence." Given that the law can and does change what
is encompassed within the category of violence, unlawful violent
behavior must be understood at least in part as arising relationally

21. Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLoS BIOLOGY
693, 693 (2007).
22. Snead, supra note 10, at 1287.
23. The prefrontal cortex comprises the "associational" part of the frontal
lobes of the brain. The frontal lobes contain motor and associational areas. The
motor areas are involved in the initiation of skilled motor activities; the
associational areas are involved in "distinctly human activities [including]
planning, memory, problem-solving, [and] social conduct."
THOMAS C.
PRITCHARD & KEVIN D. ALLOWAY, MEDICAL NEUROSCIENCE 199 (1999). The many
functions of the prefrontal cortex are discussed further, infra at notes 192-202
and accompanying text.
24. The amygdala is a small structure deep in the brain that is believed to
play a role in regulating emotion. PRITCHARD & ALLOWAY, supra note 23, at 174.
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between people and the law, rather than entirely internally to the
brain.
The final Part draws out the conceptual and epistemological
commonalities among current and historical criminal law efforts to
understand violence neurobiologically. It will argue that past and
current efforts to develop a purely brain-based understanding of
violence in criminal law manifest certain epistemological problems.
While contemporary researchers now use sophisticated techniques
to image or stimulate parts of the brain, today's claims that a
general cause of violence is overactivity or hypometabolism in
certain brain regions are not conceptually distinct from lobotomists'
claims that violence could be cured through cutting out the violent
part of the brain 25 or phrenologists' assertion that there is a "murder
bump."
Moving to the potential uses of neuroscience in the criminal
law, Part IV will contrast the legal applications of neuroscience that
would emerge from the view that violent conduct is the expression of
brain dysfunction versus those that would emerge from a view that
the brain is an important, but not exclusive, level of explanation for
different types of violent crimes. The former approach is strongly
individualistic; its prescriptions would focus on finding and treating
some disorder within the offender's brain. The second approach
would also account for medical pathology, if any. But, in viewing
the brain as a contributor to and a product of the social world, and
in viewing violence as a set of behaviors that are not per se
pathological, this approach points toward using neuroscience as one
tool to help understand an array of issues of relevance to the
criminal law, including-among other issues-how people make
decisions about obeying or breaking the law; what conditions
provoke violence in typical as well as atypical people; and the
general conditions (such as minimum early childhood needs) for
developing healthy, well-functioning minds.
I.

A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE (IN CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE)

The criminal law takes as its object the definition, deterrence,
and punishment of proscribed violent behavior; indeed, the
regulation of interpersonal violence (and the arrogation to the state
of the prerogative to inflict violence) arguably is a primary focus of
criminal lawmaking and theory.26 So explanations of the causes of25. Amygdalotomy is a type of psychosurgery (lobotomy) in which the

surgeon excises or destroys the amygdala.
26. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY
IN SOcIAL THEORY 74-81 (1990) (discussing Durkheim's view of the criminal law

as institutionalized vengeance); Martha Minow, Institutions and Emotions:
in THE PASSIONS OF THE LAw 265, 265 (Susan A.
Bandes ed., 1999) ("The institution of criminal justice in liberal societies...
transfers the authority and power to respond to private violence from the victim

Redressing Mass Violence,
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and potential ways to identify and address people prone to-violence
are, at least in theory, of great criminal law significance.
Accordingly, theories of the causes of violence and of ways to identify
and deal with people who may be prone to violence historically have
exerted tremendous pull over many criminal law scholars and
practitioners. "We are placing the question of violence right in the
middle of our basic research on the neurobiology of emotion," says
clinical psychologist Richard Davidson. 7
This Part looks at several examples of historical efforts to tackle
violence scientifically within law: phrenological studies of criminal
behavior in the early nineteenth century, Cesare Lombroso's
"scientific" criminology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and psychosurgery and subsequent, related efforts on the
neurobiological control of violence arising in part out of midtwentieth century United States race riots. This history of these
failed scientific approaches to violence in the criminal law highlights
general methodological and epistemological traps; it thus provides a
highly relevant and instructive set of lessons. The sometimes
uncanny similarities between past and current efforts also provide a
useful counterbalance to the current untempered enthusiasm for
"neurolaw" solutions to problems of violence.
A.

The OriginalScientific Criminologies
2

1.

Phrenology: You Should Have Your Head Examined

Phrenology was the nineteenth century's science of the mind.
Scientists and doctors who practiced phrenology, starting with the
Austrian anatomist Franz Josef Gall, contended that a person's
character could be determined from the bumps and hollows on the
outside of the skull. 9 From the beginning, Gall's work intersected
with the criminal law, as he principally developed his observations
and theories through examining the heads of criminals and those

. . . to the state[.]"); James Q. Whitman, Between Self-Defense and
Vengeance/Between Social Contractand Monopoly of Violence, 39 TULSA L. REV.

901, 922-23 (2004) (discussing "the monopoly of violence theory" as a
compelling "account of the purposes of criminal law").
27. Brian Mattmiller, Brain Study Sheds Light on Impulsive Violence, U.
WIS.-MADISON NEWS, July 27, 2000, available at http://www.news.wisc.edu/5121
(interview with Richard Davidson).
28. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS 239 (1997) (the expression to

"get one's head examined" is "thought [to] allude to ...phrenology"; probable
origin in "[e]arly 1900s").
29. MADELINE B. STERN, HEADS AND HEADLINES: THE PHRENOLOGICAL
FOWLERS X-XI (1971) (describing Gall's role in originating the science of
phrenology); see also JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY FAD AND SCIENCE: A 19THCENTURY AMERICAN CRUSADE 5-7 (1955) (describing phrenology); Pierre Schlag,

Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 879-81 (1997) (describing Gall's
method).
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confined for insanity.30 Specific bumps and depressions were said to31
correspond to qualities like "wit," "joking," and "poetic ability.,
Others corresponded more closely to the study of violent crime: an
"instinct to kill,3 "combativeness," and "destructiveness." ' All was
not lost, though, if your skull revealed you to be, for example,
hopelessly humorless (or murderous): you could increase the size of
your brain's funny bone, as it were, through the right sorts of
exercise, changing both your character, your brain, and
(presumably) the shape of your skull.
Fashionable citizens flocked to phrenologists to have their
"heads examined"-with decidedly mixed results.
Samuel L.
Clemens (better known as Mark Twain) visited a prominent
phrenologist in 1873, under another assumed name.3' The good
doctor discovered something remarkable about his anonymous
patient: a "total absence of the sense of humor., 3' Three months
later, the same phrenologist was delighted to welcome a very famous
new patient: Mark Twain. During the examination of Mr. Twain,
the phrenologist
discovered a "'Mount Everest . . . [of] a bump of
,, 36
humor.'

Twain's experience with phrenology was innocent fun, but
phrenology had serious impacts on the criminal law in the United
States and Europe. Phrenology informed criminal law reform
proposals, 7 jurists used phrenology to separate the criminal from
the insane and to provide reliable ways to identify both;3" expert
phrenological testimony was introduced at sentencing as a
30. Letter from Dr. F.J. Gall to Joseph Fr. de Retzer, Upon the Functions of
the Brain, In Man and Animals, reprinted in DAVID GEo GOYDER, MY BATTLE
FOR LIFE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A PHRENOLOGIST 143-52 (1857); see also
Donald Simpson, Phrenology and the Neurosciences: Contributions of F.J. Gall
and J.G. Spurzheim, 75 ANZ J. SURGERY 475, 476 (2005) (noting that Gall

regularly "palpated the heads of ...
criminals; wherever possible, he obtained
their skulls. His skull collection benefited from his association with the deputy
chief of police. .. who presumably had his own ways of obtaining the heads of
criminals"); Kenneth J. Weiss, Isaac Ray's Affair with Phrenology, 34 J. PSYCH.

& L. 455, 460 (2006) (describing Gall's development of his theories through his
work with criminal offenders); John Van Wyhe, The Authority of Human
Nature: The Schadellehre of Franz Joseph Gall, 35 BRIT. J. HIST. SCI. 17, 22
(2002) (discussing Gall's work in prisons and with criminals to develop and
perfect his cranial measurements and trait localizations).
31. Simpson, supra note 30, at 476 (reproducing list of traits).
32. Id.
33. THOMAS

SEWALL,

AN

EXAMINATION

OF PHRENOLOGY

18, 20 (1837)

(discussing phrenology critically; noting that phrenologists generally claimed
"impulsive" murderers had unusually pronounced faculties of combativeness).
34. MARK TWAIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN 64-66 (Charles
Neider ed., 1959).
35. Id. (quoting the phrenological doctor).
36. Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
37. Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain
Function:A HistoricalApproach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193, 205 (2007).

38. See discussion infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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mitigating factor; 9 and the founder of forensic psychiatry embraced
phrenology as a way of showing the trier of fact the relationship
between brain and behavior.4 °
"Prophylactic" phrenology was proposed to determine who
might be a risk for criminal behavior in the future.4
Indeed,
police departments even claimed to put this theory into
practice, training their detectives to arrest "criminal types"who had not to their knowledge committed any crime-on
sight. "Keen observers have over and over again marked and
arrested apparently inoffensive rogues, whom they had never
seen before in person or in pictures."
Phrenology also influenced the M'Naughten test for insanity;
that test's separation of the ability to know right from wrong from
the rest of the accused's state of mental disease reflects the
phrenological notion of distinct mental "organs," in significant
contrast to other, more integrative views of mind and mental
disorder.43
Judges turned to phrenology to determine the sanity of
murderers (and for many civil uses, as well, such as ascertaining the
capacity of testators and witnesses).'
In Farrer v. State, for
example, an 1853 murder case, the Ohio Supreme Court turned to
phrenology in considering whether a housekeeper could be held
criminally responsible for poisoning a young boy. 4' The judge wrote
that the housekeeper was "remarkably ugly."46 All but diagnosing
her from the bench, the judge noted that a phrenologist would just
have to look at the shape of her head to know she was criminally

39. Weiss, supra note 30, at 476.
40. Kenneth J. Weiss, Isaac Ray at 200: Phrenology and Expert Testimony,
35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 339, 344 (2007).

41. Weiss, supra note 30, at 465 (describing the development of skull
collections for research purposes to help develop preventative identification
programs); see also Nicole Rafter, The Murderous Dutch Fiddler: Criminology,
History, and the Problem of Phrenology, 9 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 65, 75

(2005).
42. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 24 (2001) (quoting the work of Boston Superintendent
of Police, BENJAMIN P. ELDRIDGE, OUR RIVAL THE RASCAL: A FAITHFUL PORTRAYAL
OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CRIMINALS OF THIS AGE AND THE DEFENDERS OF

SOCIETY-THE POLICE (1897)).

43. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615-18 (2d Cir. 1966)
(providing history of the M'Naghten test and discussing the influence of
phrenology on the development of the same).
44. Tovino, supra note 37, at 201-02.
45. 2 Ohio St. 54, 60-61 (1853); see also Tovino, supra note 37, at 202
(discussing the Farrercase).
46. Farrer,2 Ohio St. at 60 (remarking that such a shape of the skull was
"unfavorable to the usual presumption of sound mind and full capacity").
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insane, with murderous impulses.4 7
Another judge, in an 1840 civil case concerning the capacity of a
testator, spoke for the pervasive influence of phrenology on legal
culture when he stated that:
[N]o man having any regard for his reputation in medical
science, would dispute that the brain . . . consist[s] of

distinct organs, each having a distinct function, and that
power of function is influenced by organic size.
Yet, by the mid-1900s, phrenology, this "true science of the
mind" that had influenced criminal laws, criminal and civil trials,
and the course of peoples' lives, had the status of a joke. Not only
was phrenology discarded as a tool of justice-much less the path to
"Reform The World ...[and] Perfect our Republic," 9-it

was banned

in many U.S. jurisdictions alongside "fortune telling" and
astrology.5 ° In recent jurisprudence, phrenology has been classed
with "voodoo."51
This spectacular fall from grace came in the normal way:
scientists challenged phrenology internally to science, while social
theories about the nature of the mind-particularly with the advent
of Freudian psychoanalysis in the early twentieth centurychallenged it externally, ultimately resulting in an integrative
paradigm of mind with no place for fixed "brain organs." As early as
1838, neuroanatomists had shown that the brain did not have
enough discrete regions to support the claim that all major
personality traits could arise from specialized brain organs.52 Many
showed, as well, that the various parts of the brain need to work in
concert to produce most types of actions.5 3 Furthermore, it became
clear-over much social contestation, particularly about race and
sex-that brain size (and the size of parts of the brain) bore no clear

47. Id.
48. Brock v. Luckett's Executors, 5 Miss. 459 (1840); see also Tovino, supra
note 37, at 202 (discussing the Brock case).
49. Tovino, supra note 37, at 205 (quoting The American Phrenological
Journalfor 1849, 11 PHRENOLOGICAL J. 12 (1849)).
50. Tovino, supra note 37, at 203.
51. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 249 (C.M.A. 1987) (describing the
hierarchy of scientific evidence and stating that "[alt the bottom lies a junk
pile... so universally discredited that a trial judge may safely decline even to
consider [its contents], as a matter of law. To that level have been relegated
such enterprises as phrenology, astrology, and voodoo").
52. SEWALL, supra note 33, at 38-39 (criticizing phrenology for its
nonfalsifiability and noting that "[n]either the cortical or the fibrous part of the
brain reveals, upon dissection, any of those compartments or organs, upon the
existence of which the main fabric of phrenology is based").
53. WALTHER RIESE, A HISTORY OF NEUROLOGY 96 (1959) (describing the

work of nineteenth-century French neurologist Pierre Flourens on the
integrated functions of the brain).
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54
relationship to aptitude,
and that people could retain particular
traits or abilities when the part of the brain in which the trait
allegedly resided was destroyed by illness or injury.55
If phrenology's approach to the relationship between brain
structure and character sounds unscientific, or even silly, pause: it
is very close in certain respects to modem approaches.
Phrenologists identified the biology of particular parts of the brain
as the most relevant explanation for character and behavior-a
person is a killer or a humorist based on his brain's configuration.
This makes the individual brain the most (perhaps the sole) relevant
consideration in determining whether a person has a criminal
nature. Furthermore, it turns actions that people do into statuses of
what they are; a person who engages in a violent criminal act does
so because he is a biological criminal, someone physically different
from law-abiding people.
Although phrenology ultimately failed as a science, and lives as
the pseudoscience par excellence in the public and judicial
imagination,56 "it left behind a formalized concept of cerebral
localization" of complex behaviors and of root biological difference
between law-breaking and law-abiding people.57 This way of
thinking about brain structure and its relationship to criminality
left the door open to the notion that "a science not too different from

...phrenology ...

could be used" to investigate putative biological

difference between people who commit criminal acts and others.
That legacy soon would be picked up by a young doctor whose
zeitgeist included phrenology, Cesare Lombroso.
2.

Lombrosian Biological Criminology

Shortly after the demise of phrenology, "biological criminology"
(or "criminal anthropology") 9 sprang from the brain of a criminal.
When Cesare Lombroso was a young doctor at the asylum in Pavia,
he was asked to conduct a postmortem on an infamous serial rapist
and murderer. Opening the criminal's skull to reveal his brain, Dr.
Lombroso had an insight "like a flash of light."60
54.

STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN

105-42 (1981).

55. SEWALL, supra note 33, at 58.
56. See Gipson, 24 M.J. at 249.
57. Tovino, supra note 37, at 207 (citing WILLIAM R. UTAL, THE NEW
PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN 20
(2001)); see also ScoTr A. HUETTEL ET AL., FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE

IMAGING 2 (2004);

STERN, supra note

29, at 34.

58. Tovino, supra note 37, at 207.
59. For a history of this movement, see DAVID G. HORN, THE CRIMINAL
(providing an excellent

BODY: LOMBROSO AND THE ANATOMY OF DEVIANCE (2003)

general history both of Lombroso's work and of the development and influence
of the school of criminal anthropology).
60. Cesare Lombroso, Introduction to GINA LOMBROSO FERRERO, CRIMINAL
MAN: ACCORDING TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF CESARE LOMBROSO xiv-xv (1911),
excerpted in BIOLOGY, CRIME & ETHICS 37, 38 (Frank H. Marsh & Janet Katz
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He claimed to have found numerous abnormal features of the
brain (as well as the skull), including an enlargement of the
cerebellum 61 "like that found in the lower types of apes, rodents, and
birds." 62 In this moment, from this brain, Lombroso formed his
famous theory of atavistic criminality-that is, that criminality
results from a person having a throw-back brain to something lower
than the "primitive savages": indeed, back to the "carnivor[es] .63
Although biological criminology later embraced other "atavistic"
features of born criminals that linked them to the "primitive races"
(such as longer forearms and, absurdly, "the prehensile foot"), 64 it is

the head of the criminal-the house of the criminal mind-that gave
rise to the biological criminology movement.
In her well-known treatise Criminal Man, Gina Lombroso
Ferrero (Cesare's daughter) wrote of the biological differences
between criminal and noncriminal individuals, emphasizing
differences in the head and "psychic [mental] and sensitive [nervous
system] functions . . . "" Leaving no doubt about her view of the
origins of these differences, she entitled her central chapter "The
Born Criminal."6 6 In it, she writes that the "Modern, or Positive,
School of Penal Jurisprudence" maintains that people become
criminals as a result of their atavistic "psychic organisation," which
"differs essentially from that of normal individuals"; indeed,
criminals' brain structure and nervous systems "strongly resemble
primitive races."67
Lombroso's claims that criminals have atavistic brains sparked
a craze for brain dissection.66
Generally, the results of these
eds., 1985); see also

MARY GIBSON, BORN TO CRIME: CESARE LOMBROSO AND THE
ORIGINS OF BIOLOGICAL CRIMINOLOGY 20 (2002).

61. The cerebellum is a structure at the base of the brain involved in basic
voluntary motion, such as the unconscious regulation of gait and motion, and
the integration of sensory information to facilitate motion. PRITCHARD &
ALLOWAY, supra note 23, at 332.
62. LOMBROSO FERRERO, supra note 60, at 6.

63. Id. at 7.
64. Id. at 5, 7-8. Note that the features Lombroso and his followers
identified as atavistic characteristics of criminals were not, in fact, found upon
physical examination of criminals. In their desire to see criminals as akin to
the lower "carnivores," Lombroso and others asserted that born criminals had
long, fierce canine teeth and "cheek pouches," in addition to the prehensile foot.
Id. at 7; see also GOULD, supra note 54, at 127 (discussing forearm ratios); id. at
129 (discussing the prehensile foot).
65. LOMBROSO FERRERO, supra note 60, at 5.
66. Id. at iii.

67. Id. at 5.
68. See generally Robert Fletcher, President, Anthropological Soc'y of
Washington, Address before the Anthropological Society of Washington (Apr.
21, 1891), in 4 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 201, July 1891, at 201-36 (summarizing
brain dissection work of noted anthropological criminologists and describing the
results). For a general introduction to Lombroso's work, see, for example,
CESARE LOMBROSO, CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES (Henry P. Horton ed. &
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dissections proved disappointing: they did not confirm any
systematic differences in the gross anatomy of violent criminals'
brains relative to those not convicted of criminal offenses. 69 But
Lombroso and his followers were not dissuaded by these facts: while
they acknowledged that the abnormalities Lombroso described in his
first specimen were not present in "other degenerates," different
brain abnormalities nevertheless were "prevalent in criminals." °
The absence of any consistent correlations between structural brain
defects and criminality seemed to reflect only that the brain is "a
very recalcitrant organ [that] gives us an infinite deal of trouble
when we attempt to establish positive relations between its
substance and the operations of the faculties of the mind ....
The failure of brain dissection to confirm systematic differences
between criminals and noncriminals tempered some claims by
Lombrosians. However, they did not retreat from claims about
brain differences related to violence.
Gina Lombroso Ferrero
acknowledged that "lesser criminals" may not possess atavistic
brains; yet, those who commit "peculiarly monstrous" crimes, like
murder, nearly always demonstrate the "atavistic" brains of
animals. 2 There is no evidence that the brain dissections of this era
did produce findings of structural brain differences between
perpetrators of violent crimes versus nonviolent crimes (or of
noncriminals); yet, the insistence on physical differences violent
criminals' brains seemed particularly "sticky," difficult to dislodge in
light of countervailing evidence.
Lombrosian biological criminology reveals fascinating parallels
to contemporary claims about the neurological bases of violent
crime. Today's assertion that "crime [is] a disease"73 flowing from
disordered "neurobiology" echos the claims of early twentieth
century biological criminologists like L. Hamilton McCormick, who
asserted, "[c]rime is ... pathological"; it is "pathological, as it is
owing to morbid affections of the brain that men frequently adopt
crime as a profession., 74 Placed side-by-side without citations, a
reader would have difficulty distinguishing the Lombrosian
statement from the new neurolaw statement-one claims that

trans., 1911); see also Marvin Wolfgang, Cesare Lombroso, 1835-1909, in
PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY 232, 246-57 (Hermann Mannheim ed., 2d ed. 1972)
(describing Lombroso's work on the putative physical abnormalities of convicted
criminals).
69. Fletcher, supra note 68, at 219.
70.

LOMBROSO FERRERO, supra note 60, at 6.

71. Id. at 22.
72. Id. at 7-8 (quoting VICTOR HUGO, The Last Days of a Condemned, in
THE DEATH PENALTY: A LITERARY AND HISTORIcAL APPROACH 103, 105 (Edward
G. McGehee & William H. Hildebrand eds., 1964).
73. Kirchmeier, supra note 4, at 631.
74.

L.

HAMILTON MCCORMICK, CHARACTEROLOGY: AN EXACT SCIENCE 560

(1920).
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"crime [is] a disease" and the other that "crime is... pathological";
one says it flows from "neurobiology," and one says it flows from the
"brain." The current view is that violence emerges from disorders of
the prefrontal cortex, which is said to regulate executive function
and judgment; the nineteenth century criminal anthropologists
claimed a relationship to deficits in the "the antero-superior district
of the brain," roughly equivalent to the prefrontal cortex, "which
betokens morality and trustworthiness ....
If the ghosts of Lombroso were those of mere bad sciencefaulty data or superseded hypotheses-we could look back but
fleetingly at the specter. But it signifies more. Lombroso is a
synecdoche for the hope that a biological criminology is possible,
A
that the laws of man can yield to the laws of science.
contemporary critic of biological criminology (or "criminal
anthropology") spoke to its shortcomings in language that could
apply equally to the neurolaw of today, saying that the field:
[0]ccupies the debatable ground between science and
philosophy. As a science, it is positive and aggressive. As a
philosophy, it consists almost wholly of negations, the chief of
which are the negation of spirit, of freedom of the will, and of
moral responsibility. 6
B. Listless Monkeys and Raging Bulls: Twentieth Century
Psychointervention
Psychointervention'sPromise to Cure Violence
1.
While biological criminology fell into disrepute, like phrenology
before it, it nevertheless helped spawn the next set of tragic errors
in the relationship between criminal law and brain science: direct
brain interventions against the putative neurobiology of violence. In
the tumultuous middle of the twentieth century, it seemed that
"human violence [was] the most threatening problem in our world
But the so-called violence problem, fortunately, appeared
"solvable"-through the miracles of psychosurgery (lobotomy)" and
75. Id. at 562.
76. FREDERICK HOWARD WINES, PUNISHMENT AND REFORMATION:
HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM 254(1895).

AN

77. VERNON H. MARK & FRANK R. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN 1 (1970).
78. There are several terms for surgical interventions in the brain aimed at

modifying behavior.

While the term "lobotomy" has the greatest common

currency, it actually refers to one specific type of brain surgery, excision or
destruction of a portion of the brain's frontal lobes-hence, "lobe-otomy." Other

terms for brain surgeries aimed at changing mood or behavior (rather than
correcting a medical pathology) include psychiatric neurosurgery, mental
surgery, functional neurosurgery, sedative neurosurgery, and psychosurgery.
See Stephan L. Chorover, The Pacification of the Brain, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May
1974, at 59, 59. This type of surgery is not "directed at treating specific kinds of
neuropathology (e.g., tumors and strokes) or disorders of movement (e.g.,
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electrode implantation. 9 This enthusiasm for psychointervention
carried forward beliefs about the brain as the best level on which to
address criminality, the localization of violence to specific parts of
the brain, and about the biological differences between people who
do and do not commit violent crimes.
These continuities between mid-century psychointervention and
prior criminal law-brain science movements are not only thematic
but actually historical. Psychosurgery's earliest founder, Gottleib
Burckhardt, drew his inspiration directly from the claims of innate
brain difference advanced by Lombrosian criminology and
phrenology.
Reasoning that "[olur psychological existence is
composed of single elements, which are localized in separate areas of
the brain," Burckhardt believed that he could literally "extirpat[e]"
unwanted behaviors by removing specific portions of the brain. 0
In 1891, Burckhardt tested this idea by removing the cerebral
cortices8 of six people confined in his asylum in Prefargier,
Switzerland. 2 His results were poor (one patient died and five
remained at least as psychotic) and so it was not until nearly fifty
years later that psychosurgery took off-following the chance
encounter of a Portuguese politician and some apathetic monkeys. 3
In 1935, Antonio Egas Moniz, a retired Portuguese ambassador
with training in neuroscience, attended the International Congress
of Neurology in Boston.84 There, two American researchers, John
Fulton and Carlyle Jacobsen, presented their results on lesions in
the frontal lobes and/or amygdalae of monkeys and chimpanzees:
these primates ordinarily were hostile to researchers but, after
bilateral lesions to their frontal lobes, were "strikingly indifferent to
stimuli that preoperatively provoked responses of extreme agitation
and frustration."5
They showed drastic behavioral changes,
including deficits in learning and memory, but also were listless or
tremors and paralysis)." Id. I use "psychosurgery" throughout because it is the
common term in the scientific and medical literature, and it encompasses a
broader range of behavioral-focused neurosurgeries than the more limited term
"lobotomy."
79. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 77, at 1 (calling the violence problem
"solvable" and advocating psychosurgery and other brain interventions).
80. Stephan L. Chorover, Psychosurgery: A Neuropsychological Perspective,
54 B.U. L. REV. 231, 232-33 (1974) (quoting E. Valenstein, BRAIN CONTROL
(1974) (urging his colleagues to "tread the path of cortical extirpation")).
81. The cerebral cortex is the outer layer of the brain, with all the
characteristic convolutions and folds. It is believed to be an evolutionarily later
development and the site of many of "higher," or distinctively human, brain
functions.
82. Chorover, supra note 80, at 232-33. This is the first instance of
psychosurgery reported in any western medical journal. Id. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to address brain surgeries performed by other cultures such
as, for example, trepanning by ancient American civilizations.
83. Id. at 233.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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86

tame. Moniz asked the presenters if similar surgery could "relieve
anxiety states" in people.
Fulton and Jacobsen were shocked at Moniz's suggestion, but
Moniz put his idea into action immediately. On his return to
Portugal, Moniz and a colleague performed twenty surgeries in a
ten-week period on human subjects in which they destroyed portions
of the patients' frontal lobes.8 Touting his successes, Moniz claimed
that these people were miraculously "cured," and that those "who
had previously been violent.., became calm, tractable, and
generally easier to manage." 9 Lobotomy as a treatment for violence,
cloaked in a heavy degree of (possibly self-deluding)
misrepresentation about its safety and efficacy, was born.
Moniz's purported successes with frontal lobe surgery (hence
"lobe-otomy") led him to be awarded the Nobel Prize in 1949.90 And,
it led to tens of thousands of psychosurgeries in the United States
and around the world. In the United States alone, about 70,000
people were subjects of lobotomy between the 1940s and mid1960s. 9'
The fascination with brain-based causes of and potential "cures"
for violence pervaded brain sciences in the mid-century. Animal
studies, particularly with monkeys, rats, and one very famous bull,
seemed to point the way toward controlling man's more animal
nature. Proselytizers for the criminal law applications of "sedative
psychosurgery," as they called it, Vernon Mark and Frank Ervin
drew heavily on the same kind of monkey studies that first inspired

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 234. Moniz's original technique consisted of injecting alcohol and
wax into portions of the brain, causing brain tissue to coagulate and die. Later,
he refined his technique into what he termed the "leucotomy," using a speciallydesigned cutting instrument, the leucotome, to remove portions of brain tissue.
Later techniques were both more and less crude. Id.
Walter Freeman
notoriously pioneered the "ice pick" lobotomy, a simple procedure in which an
ice pick-like device was driven through the orbits of the skull and into the
frontal lobes; given its simplicity, it was performed in a near-assembly line
fashion. An innovation of greater sophistication was stereotactic neurosurgery,
which, using three-dimensional maps of the brain and highly specialized
surgical equipment, allowed for precise surgeries anywhere in the brain,
including in its deeper structures like the amygdala. STANLEY FINGER, ORIGINS
OF NEUROSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF EXPLORATIONS INTO BRAIN FUNCTION

292-94

(1994).
89. Chorover, supra note 80, at 234.
90. JEROME KAGAN, AN ARGUMENT FOR MIND 52-53 (2006).
91. See Hearingon S. 974, S. 878, and S.J.Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong. 340 (1973)
(noting that about 50,000 Americans received lobotomies between the 1940s
and mid-1950s); see also ELLIOT S. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN CONTROL: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF BRAIN STIMULATION AND PSYCHOSURGERY 58 (1974) (stating that
approximately 4,000 psychosurgeries per year were performed on U.S. patients
from 1960 through about 1964).
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Moniz. Mark and Ervin noted that "after both temporal lobes have
been removed," monkeys are "placid, can be easily handled, and do
not respond aggressively even to attack. .. " They also seem
without anxiety, putting objects in their mouths "that ordinarily
provoke fear, such as small snakes."93 Showing even more dramatic
examples of subduing primal violence, "[1]ocalized removal of the
amygdala will tame a predatory and vicious lynx or a wolverine." 94
Analogizing people who have committed criminal violence to the
"lynx or . . . wolverine," they note that, "[i]ndeed, neurosurgeons

have surgically removed areas of the amygdala to treat assaultive
behavior in patients....95

Around the same time, "an alternate form of psychosurgery '9 electrical stimulation of parts of the brain-also promised a solution
to the "violence problem." Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the
criminal law and scientific communities together explored electrical
brain stimulation as a method to "effectively wipe out violence" in
society. 97
The majority of this work consisted of electrical
stimulation of parts of animals' brains to evoke or suppress what the
researchers characterized as violent behavior or inappropriate
sexual behavior. In perhaps the most dramatic piece of theater a
scientist ever staged, Dr. Jose Delgado of Yale University organized
a bullfight-a special bullfight designed to show the triumph of
neuroscience over animal aggression. Delgado arranged a 'brave
bull,' a variety bred to respond with a raging charge when it sees
any human being."98 Delgado implanted an electrode in the caudate
nucleus of the bull's brain and, before a packed audience of
scientists, media, and others, Delgado stopped the charging bull by
activating the electrode-the power of science stopping animal
aggression in its tracks. 99
92. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 77, at 28.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 29. Sampling here just some of the work summarized and relied
upon by Mark and Ervin, id. at 38-46; B.N. Brunnell et al., Septal Lesions and
Aggressiveness in the Cotton Rat, Sigmodon Hispidus, 6 PSYCHONEUROLOGICAL
ScI. 443 (1966); C.E. Davis, The Physiological Analysis of Aggressive Behavior,
in SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION AMONG VERTEBRATEs 53 (W. Etkin ed.,

1964); M.D. Egger & J.P. Flynn, Effects of Electrical Stimulation of the
Amygdala on Hypothamically Elicited Attack Behavior in Cats, 26 J.
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 705 (1963); H. Ursin & B. Kaada, Functional Localization
within the Amygdaloid Complex in the Cat, 12 EEG CLIN. NEUROPHYSIOL. 1
(1960); L. Weiskrantz, Behavioral Changes Associated with Ablation of the
Amygdaloid Complex in Monkeys, 49 J. COMP. PHYSIOL. PSYCHOL. 381 (1956).
95. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 77, at 29.

96. Lauren Slater, Who Holds the Clicker? NeuroscientistsHope that Brain
Implants Can Treat Intractable Mental Illness, MOTHER JONES, 2005 WLNR

17886179 (Nov. 1, 2005).
97. Id.
98. Boyce Rensberger, Can a Pill Be Mightier Than the Sword?, N.Y TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1971, at E9.
99. Id.
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Delgado's work seemed to hold tremendous and direct promise
for law enforcement. Recruited by government agencies, Delgado
worked for many years (although fruitlessly) on a brain-computer
interface and on brain stimulation techniques to control human
violence. 100

2. Psychointerventionand CriminalLaw Initiatives
While psychointervention, like phrenology and biological
criminology, started out in asylums, it, too, soon made inroads into
criminal law through its participation in the discourse on violence."'
Indeed, if psychosurgery could fix the brain "dysfunction" causing
violent conduct among the mentally ill, why stop at the asylum
gates? Psychointervention might quell civil unrest (associated with
the mid-century struggle for civil rights) and all kinds of other
criminal violence. 10 2 Particularly, psychosurgery might "treat"
urban rioters, leaders of civil unrest (i.e., those involved in the civil
rights movement), and violent prisoners of all kinds. °3 As the
heralds of this transition of psychosurgery from a psychiatric
treatment
to
an
all-purpose
social
curative
wrote,
psychointervention offers "a new and biologically oriented approach
to the problem of human violence."0 4
Under the view of mind and behavior that animated
psychointervention, violence can only arise from brain disorderbecause with a "well-ordered brain," a person "need never be out of
control."'05 If a person does go "out of control," then there are only
two possible reasons: "either the limbic system [which includes the
amygdalal has become pathologically hyperactive" or "its neocortical
[frontal lobe-executive function] (control) inputs have become
abnormal.' 0 6 In their landmark book Violence and the Brain,
Professors Mark and Ervin of Harvard and MIT argued that such
"brain malfunction" causes "a low threshold for impulsive violence"
and that people convicted
of a crime involving violence likely suffer
0 7
from such brain disease.

100. Morning Edition: Neuroscientists Gather in Washington to Discuss
Cutting-EdgeResearch and Cautionary Reflections on Stem Cell Research (NPR
radio broadcast May 20, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 25360638 (noting that
Delgado's goal was to develop technologies such that governments could use
brain stimulation to control people's behavior).
101. See Chorover, supra note 80, at 232-33.
102. Vernon H. Mark et al., Letter to the Editor, Role of Brain Disease in
Riots and Urban Violence, 201 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 217, 217 (1967) (arguing that
urban race riots were born not of rage at oppression or poverty but of
physiological "dysfunction" in the rioters); see also MARK & ERVIN, supra note
77, at 1.
103. See Chorover, supra note 80, at 245.
104. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 77, at xi.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Id. at 32-33.
107. Id. at 2.
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Deriding views that crime rates reflect levels of policing, or
socioeconomic or demographic factors, these researchers asserted
that criminal violence is caused and explained exclusively by the
perpetrators' disordered neurobiology.'0 8 Thus, they recommended
that people convicted of crimes of violence should have
psychosurgery to remove their amygdalae."°9 In this, Mark and
Ervin were emblematic of a broader movement in the biological
control of violence and particularly of proposals to perform
psychosurgery or electrode implantation on prisoners."0
While mass lobotomization of urban protesters and prisoners
never did take place, a few experiments on prisoners tested out the
idea."' In 1968, under the auspices of the California Department of
Corrections, several prisoners (including one minor) at the Vacaville
State Penitentiary in Vacaville, California, underwent surgical
implantation of electrodes for the purpose of destroying amygdalar
tissue; the goal was to eradicate their desire and ability to engage in
violent behavior."' The experiment was carried out by a military
surgeon from a nearby air force base, and Vacaville used its
metalwork shop to craft a special device to hold the prisoners' heads
in place for the procedure. 3
The Vacaville experiment produced poor results: the one
prisoner whose surgery the prison authorities deemed successful,
and who was paroled, was rearrested for robbery almost
immediately after his release.'
Nevertheless, enthusiasm for
solving criminal problems through psychointerventions went on
unabated. In 1972, the Neuropsychiatric Institute of the University
of California at Los Angeles proposed to develop a Center for the
Study and Reduction of Violence, intended to identify violent
predispositions and develop brain-based techniques for preventing
and treating violent behavior."' The Center was to be funded

108. Id. at xi (deriding theories that relate rates of violent crimes either to
levels of policing or to social and economic factors).
109. See

ELLIOT S. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN CONTROL: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF

253-54 (1973) (discussing the work of
Mark and Ervin).
110. For example, in 1970, the International Conference of Psychosurgeons
entertained proposals to "initiate pilot programs for precise rehabilitation
[through psychosurgery] of the prisoner-patient who is often young and
intelligent, yet incapable of controlling various forms of violence." Id. at 255
(quoting remarks of Dr. M. Hunter Brown).
111. Robert J. Trotter, A Clockwork Orange in a California Prison, SCI.
NEWS, Mar. 11, 1972, at 174.
112. Id. at 174-75.
113. Leroy F. Aarons, Brain Surgery Is Tested on 3 California Convicts,
WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1972, at Al, A20.
114. Id. at A20.
115. Dorothy Nelkin & Judith P. Swazey, Science and Social Control:
BRAIN STIMULATION AND PSYCHOSURGERY

Controversies Over Research on Violence, in BIOLOGY, CRIME AND ETHICS 344,

346 (Frank H. Marsh & Janet Katz eds., 1985).
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primarily by the federal
Law Enforcement
Assistance
Administration ("LEAA"). 116
In furtherance of its violenceprevention strategy, the LEAA also extensively funded research
into
17
brain implants and other brain intervention techniques. 1
Ultimately, the once-heralded efforts to address criminal
problems through psychosurgery and electrostimulation led
lawmakers and neuroscientists alike to call to restrict the
procedures,
particularly
on
prisoners
and
children.""
Psychointervention is easy to dismiss as horrifying but irrelevant;
the technology seems primitive, and there is little risk that similar
technologies would be tested on prisoners and incompetents today,
given the advent of rigorous Internal Review Boards for human
experimentation and heightened ethical awareness. 19
Yet, psychointervention has immediate lessons now. While we
now know that the claims of psychointervention were inflated and
we reject its abuses, its logic-like that of phrenology-is both
elegant and fully consistent with prior movements in understanding
violence entirely internal to the brain: either violent people have
disordered thoughts,'120 produced by frontal lobes disorder; or they
have abnormal fear and rage reactions, which arise from the
amygdala. 12' The investigator then tries to solve what he or she has
defined as the brain'sviolence problem through brain interventiona seductively simple solution to a multifaceted and complex set of
problems. In this, we see a version of the same argument currently
advanced in reductionist approaches to neuroscience in criminal
law-that dysfunction of the amygdala (or other parts of the brain
regulating emotional processing), or of the frontal lobes, is the most
prevalent and relevant cause of violent crime.
II.

THE NEW CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE OF VIOLENT
CRIME

While many kinds of behaviors might be of legal and social
interest,' 22 there

"is

a

marked

tendency"

in

neurobiological

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 86, 93d Cong. (1973) (statement of Sen. Beal)
(introducing a resolution calling for a two-year moratorium on psychosurgery
during which the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare would assess
available data and make recommendations on the procedures); Chorover, supra
note 80, at 247 (proposing creation of regulatory agencies at the state and
federal level to recognize that psychosurgery is experimental; safeguard
prisoners, children, and the mentally retarded; and develop a registry of all
psychosurgery procedures to allow follow-up of patients who undergo
psychosurgery).
119. Slater, supra note 96 (describing review boards and FDA oversight for
experimental neurosurgical medical devices and procedures).
120. KAGAN, supra note 90, at 52-53.
121. Id.
122.

BRENT GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND AND THE
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discussions of crime "to focus on violent behaviors."123 Indeed, the
"[p]rediction of violence," as well as its control, is a central, shared
interest of "science [and] the legal system" and is likely to remain a
core area of collaboration between these fields. 124 For this reason,
there is "a massive (and growing) body of scientific literature on
both the neuroanatomical and neurochemical bases" of violence. 12 5
The major criminal law prescriptions that are emerging from
this work include challenges to retributive rationales for
punishment and to capital punishment. 26 Extending the premises
of this work further, that because all human conduct emerges from a
determined brain system and our sense of free will and choice are
purely illusory, criminal law should proceed on consequentialist
grounds only, with punishment127 being replaced by a system of
medically-tailored rehabilitation.
While this is intended to be humane, it is worth keeping in
mind Paul Robinson's argument that "the harshness of the current
system may be attributed in largest part to the move to
rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence, which 12disconnected
8
criminalpunishment from the constraint ofjust desert."
SCALES OF JUSTICE: A SUMMARY REPORT ON AN INVITATIONAL MEETING CONVENED
BY THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE AND THE DANA

FOUNDATION 9 (2004).

123. Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 90

(2006).

124. GARLAND, supra note 122, at 9 (containing a section entitled "Predicting
Violence," when no other section of the report expressly was dedicated to
predicting any other type of behavior).
125. Snead, supra note 10, at 1293-94 (citations omitted). Professor Snead
has conducted an admirable literature review of the recent neuroimaging work
on violence and aggression. See id. at 1298-99 (citing Antoine Bechara et al.,
Insensitivity to Future Consequences Following Damage to Human Prefrontal
Cortex, 50 COGNITION 7, 8 (1994) (demonstrating connection between prefrontal
lobe damage and impaired decisionmaking through neuropsychological testing);
R. James R. Blair, Editorial, NeurobiologicalBasis of Psychopathy, 182 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 5 (2003) (discussing neuroimaging studies finding association
between amygdala dysfunction and psychopathy and noting probable
impairment of orbitofrontal cortex in psychopathic individuals); R. James R.
Blair, Neurocognitive Models ofAggression, the Antisocial PersonalityDisorders,
and Psychopathy, 71 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 727 (2001)
(discussing neurocognitive models of aggression and relating them to
explanations of antisocial personality disorder); Antonio R. Damasio, A Neural
Basis for Sociopathy, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 128, 128-29 (2000) (noting
that the observed reduction in prefrontal white matter volume in psychopaths
supports the view that sociopathy is "related to the malfunction of... critical
components in the prefrontal cortex"); Kent A. Kiehl et al., Limbic
Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal Psychopaths as Revealed by
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 677 (2001)
(examining correlation between affective processing anomalies in criminal
psychopaths and deficient input from limbic structures)).
126. Snead, supra note 10, at 1269-70.
127. Id. at 1270.
128. Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.L's Proposed Distributive Principle of
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A. Does Violent Crime Arise from PrefrontalCortex and
Amygdalar Dysfunction?
Members of several fields who currently work on criminal
violence assert that criminal violence arises as a result of
dysregulation of the prefrontal cortex ("pfc") and the amygdaleindeed, that these parts of the brain "play preeminent roles in
[violent] behavior.' 29 So far, the "core findings" on violence and the
brain are that the amygdala is involved in "fear and other negative
emotions," while the orbitofrontal cortex (a portion of the pfc)
contributes to "constraining impulsive outbursts [j,130 According to
proponents of this view, a diverse body of research, including new
neuroimaging and older animal studies, supports the notion that
violent behavior initiates in the amygdala and that its expression is
regulated by the pfc."3 '

"Limiting Retributivism": Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure
Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 14 (2003) (emphasis in original).
129. Christopher M. Filley et al., Toward an Understanding of Violence:
Neurobehavioral Aspects of Unwarranted Physical Aggression: Aspen
Neurobehavioral Conference Consensus Statement, 14 NEUROPSYCHIATRY
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. NEUROLOGY 1, 1 (2001) (discussing conclusions of

the Aspen Neurobehavioral Conference's consensus statement on the
relationship between mind, brain, and violence); see also Snead, supra note 10,
at 1294.
130. BRUCE H. DOBKIN, THE CLINICAL SCIENCE OF NEUROLOGIC
REHABILITATION 61 (2003) (quoting Richard Davidson et al., Dysfunction in the
Neural Circuitry of Emotion Regulation-A Possible Prelude to Violence, 289

Sci. 591, 591-94 (2000)).
131. See Snead, supra note 10, at 1294-95 & nn.146, 148 & 150 (reviewing
research on the relationship between amygdala and pfc function, and violent
behavior). For some of the most significant work in this area, see M.C. Brower
& B.H. Price, Neuropsychiatry of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Violent and
Criminal Behaviour: A Critical Review, 71 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY &

PSYCHIATRY 720, 722-23 (2001) (surveying eighteen neuroimaging or
neuropsychological studies touching on frontal lobe dysfunction and violent
behavior); Richard L. Frierson & Ryan D. Finkenbine, Psychiatric and
Neurological Characteristics of Murder Defendants Referred for Pretrial
Evaluation, 49 J. FORENSIC SCI. 604, 605 (2004) (discussing studies observing

frontal lobe dysfunction in murderers); Adrian Raine et al., Prefrontal Glucose
Deficits in Murderers Lacking Psychosocial Deprivation, 11 NEUROPSYCHIATRY
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. NEUROLOGY 1, 2 (1998) (examining whether

"prefrontal dysfunction may specifically characterize violent offenders who lack

psychosocial deficits"); Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal and Increased
Subcortical Brain FunctioningAssessed Using Positron Emission Tomography
in Predatory and Affective Murderers, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 319, 321 (1998)

[hereinafter Raine, Reduced] (assessing "differences between affective and
predatory murderers in cortical and subcortical brain functioning"); Adrian
Raine et al., Brain Abnormalities in Murderers Indicated by Positron Emission
Tomography, 42 BIOLOGY PSYCHIATRY 495 (1997); Adrian Raine et al., Selective
Reductions in Prefrontal Glucose Metabolism in Murderers, 36 BIOLOGY
PSYCHIATRY 365, 365-66, 370-71 (1994) [hereinafter Raine, Selective]. In 2005,

Jana L. Bufkin and Vickie R. Luttrell reviewed seventeen neuroimaging studies
of aggressive, violent, and antisocial psychiatric patients, and concluded that
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Impressive, even astounding, statistics support the claim that
frontal lobe or pfc dysfunction is the major cause of all kinds of
violent crime. Professor Richard Redding, citing Dr. Adrian Raine's
studies of incarcerated criminals, contends that "the prevalence rate
[sic] of brain dysfunction. .. [is] ninety-four percent among homicide
offenders, [and] sixty-one percent among habitually aggressive
adults ....
By contrast, the claimed "prevalence rate [of
33 brain
dysfunction] in the general population is only three percent."1
While some more cautious legal scholars and neuroscience
researchers note that the causal relationship between the degree of
frontal lobe activity and any specific conduct is at best
unestablished,13 others leap forward: we are asked to believe that
"neuroscience
research...
provides
compelling explanatory
evidence" that frontal lobe dysfunction plays "a causal role" in most
types of violent crime. 35 Following this view, understanding pfc and
amygdalar dysfunction should provide the foundation for future
"criminology, crime prevention efforts, and the functioning of the
criminal justice system." 36
B.
Claims that ParticularCrimes Arise from Specific Neural
Patterns-ABiological Basis for Terrorism?
Related to the claims that dysfunction in two key brain regions
are involved in violent crime, some scholars contend that particular
types of neural activation patterns within these and related regions
give rise to specific violent crimes. Future work, it is claimed, may

prefrontal dysfunction is "consistently related to aggressive and/or violent
behavior["
Jana L. Bufkin & Vickie R. Luttrell, Neuroimaging Studies of
Aggressive and Violent Behavior, 6 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 176, 182 (2005).
132. Redding, supra note 3, at 57 (emphasis added) (citing Nathaniel J.
Pallone & James J. Hennessy, Brain Dysfunction and Criminal Violence, 35
SOC'Y 21, 21 (1998)). Note that Pallone and Hennessy used a particularly
expansive definition of brain dysfunction.
133. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Richard E. Redding, Why It Is Essential to
Teach About Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law (And a Primer on How To
Do It), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL' 407, 408-10 (2004) (reviewing data on the
prevalence of mental disorders among adults who come into contact with the
criminal justice system)).
134. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The Promise (andLimits) of Neuroeconomics,
58 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (noting that "[elven at its most sophisticated, brain
imaging can only give us a map of correlations, which are physical events in the
brain that correspond to the activity of the mind"); id. at 14 (describing some
neuroeconomics studies based on neuroimaging as "flirt[ing] with the emptiness
of mere correlation").
135. Redding, supra note 3, at 57-58 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Raine,
Reduced, supra note 131, at 327-28; Adrian Raine, Selective, supra note 131 at
365-66 (finding lower than average glucose metabolism in the lateral and
medial prefrontal cortex of murderers who agreed to be tested; hypothesizing
decreased activity in these brain regions may be predictive of one's propensity
to violence).
136. Bufkin & Luttrell, supra note 131, at 176.
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establish the biological basis for all types of human violence,
including "[a]cts of ethnic cleansing, school shootings, bombings,
It is suggested
hostage takings, [and] incidents of terrorism ....
that there may be a unique "neural topograph[y]" for every crime
ranging from "sadistic murder[ ]" to "political terroris[m]." 138 This
understanding, in turn, "will contribute to [the] detection, control,
and alleviation" of violent crime, in part through predicting a
,,139
person's "level of dangerousness, and risk of recidivism ....
Additionally, with such an understanding of the causes (or at
least markers) of particular crimes, lawmakers may be able to
approach different types of criminal violence based on the
(putatively) distinct neurobiology of each. 4 °
Research on the
What is the basis for these claims?
neurobiology of bombers themselves is extremely limited (and
necessarily excludes subjects who might be of the greatest interest,
successful suicide bombers). 4 ' The most comprehensive study of
school shooters, issued in 2000 by the FBI, focused on behavioral
warning signs; it did not investigate school shooters on the
neurobiological level.' To date, no studies have been conducted on
neurobiology and terrorism14 ' or neurobiology and ethnic or political
violence. Rather, these claims that specific crimes arise from
specific brain dysfunction grow out of two important but indirect
strands of research: decades of experiments on aggression in
studies using functional magnetic
animals, and a few recent human
44
resonance imaging ("fC RI").1
137. Joseph E. McEllistrem, Affective and Predatory Violence: A Bimodal
Classification System of Human Aggression and Violence, 10 AGGRESSION &
VIOLENT BEHAV. 1, 22 (2004).
138. Mobbs et al., supra note 21, at 695.
139. McEllistrem, supra note 137, at 22-23.
140. Mobbs et al., supra note 21, at 695.
141. McEllistrem, supra note 137, at 21 (noting research on bombers is
"limited," speculating on characteristics of bombers based on the study of bomb-

disposal experts and summarizing the existing research).
142. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE
GROUP, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 1 (2000),

http://www.fbi.gov/publications/school/school2.pdf (reviewing school shootings
and developing a four-prong threat assessment matrix).
143. Judy Skatssoon, In the Mind of a Terrorist, ABC HEALTH & MED.NEWS

Aug.

21,

2006, http://www.abc.net.au/science/news/health/HealthRepublish

1720057.htm (quoting Susan Greenfield, Director, Oxford Centre for Science of
the Mind) (stating that no studies have been conducted on the neurobiology of
terrorist behavior).
144. For a synopsis of how brain images are made and interpreted, see, for
example, Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior:
Limitations in the Legal Use of FunctionalMagnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM.
J.L. & MED. 271, 272-76 (2007) (describing the mechanics of EEG, PET, and
fMRI image production and interpretation in a section entitled "Basics of Brain
Imaging"). For a discussion of the "limitations and distortions" of fMRI, see id.
at 278-80 (noting that, among other difficulties, brain images can "vary
significantly both between subjects and across sessions [with the same
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Animal models of aggression have provided the basis for
research on human violence for about a century. In these studies,
cats and rats display different patterns of brain activation
depending on whether they were provoked to display "defensive
rage" or "predatory aggression. 4 5 (In ordinary English, "defensive
rage" and "predatory aggression" in cats and rats translate roughly
to "guarding territory from other cats or rats" and "preying on rats
or mice.") Violence researchers have extrapolated from these
distinct patterns of aggression in animals that people, similarly,
may have different neurological bases for what they call "hot"
violence-crimes of sudden rage, like heat of passion crimes-and
"cold" crimes of premeditation, like the proverbial cold-blooded
1 46
killing.

In one recent article, Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, the
authors argue that a universal brain circuitry may underlie people's
"defensive" violent acts (like justified self-defense, as well as
inappropriate violent responses to what a similarly situated
reasonable person would not perceive as a threat) versus their
"predatory" aggressive acts, like an act of revenge, a crime for
financial
gain, or other premeditated violent crimes. 147
Extrapolating further from the general categories of defensive and
predatory aggression in cats and rats, the authors propose that
distinct "neural topographies" may underlie specific types of crimes,
ranging from "sadistic murder[ ]" to "political terroris[m] .
On one level, these types of claims that distinct patterns of
neural activation underlie different behaviors must be true: insofar
as there is a materialist basis for all human thought and action,
there likely are distinct neurobiological correlates for thinking of or
engaging in any X versus any Y-say, liking or not liking a
particular

restaurant.1 49

That

proposition

is

likely

to

be

uncontroversial, but also merely trivially true; it tells us nothing
about causation-about the relationship between observed neural
subject]").
145. McEllistrem, supra note 137, at 3-4.
146. Id. at 14-16. For articles distinguishing between "hot" and "cold"
crimes based on models of animal aggression, among many see, for example,
Leonard Berkowitz, Is Something Missing? Some Observations Prompted by the
Cognitive-Neoassociationist View of Anger and Emotional Aggression, in
35, 35-37 (L. Rowell Huesmann

AGGREssIvE BEHAVIOR: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES

ed., 1994).
147. Mobbs et al., supra note 21, at 695 (representing a collaboration
between specialists in neuroimaging and legal scholars).
148. Id. It is unclear which of these crimes is supposed to be "hot" or "cold,"
as high affect like rage, as well as premeditation, could be present in both.
149. See Elizabeth A. Phelps & Laura A. Thomas, Race, Behavior, and the
Brain: The Role of Neuroimaging in UnderstandingComplex Social Behaviors,
24 POL. PSYCHOL. 747, 754-55 (2003) (using the example of how experience with
a restaurant would be encoded into one's brain, but that that has little follow-on
significance for).
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activation patterns, why those patterns are present, and how they
relate to why people do the things they do.150
The claim that a distinct "neural topography" might underlie
"sadistic murder" or "political terrorism" is a much larger claim than
the trivial truth claim above: this claim is not that brain activation
patterns reflect and enable everything that people do (and that, on
average, very similar patterns will underlie the same actions across
neurotypical people). Instead, it is the claim that people engage in
particular crimes because of specific, disordered neurobiology. At a
minimum, under this view, the brain of a political terrorist would
function differently from that of a sexual sadist; at the most, a
person would become a terrorist or sexual sadist because he
possessed a certain functional or structural neurobiological
predisposition or defect. The authors expressly embrace this more
radical claim, stating that while "[a]t first glance, such reasoning
looks like phrenological folly," nevertheless "studies strongly suggest
that some kinds of criminal behaviour are associated with
dysfunction of different regions of the brain."...
Only if the case is the latter is it meaningful to propose that
lawmakers ought to approach crimes based on their distinct
neurobiology-or that the criminal law finally could realize the
Lombrosian dream of a biological criminology.152 Thus, this view of
the neurobiology of violence, like its forbearers in other criminal law
and neuroscience movements, posits that disordered brains are the
most relevant site at which to understand the cause of violent
crimes, and that many people who commit crimes of violence do so
as a result of neurobiological dysfunction.
A recent and striking example of this type of imaging study is
Professor Martin Walter's Pedophilia Is Linked to Reduced
Activation in Hypothalamus and Lateral Prefrontal Cortex During
Visual Erotic Stimulation.5 3 Walter's study is the first to use fMRI
to compare the neurological responses of self-described pedophiles
and self-described normal adults to erotic material featuring
adults.'
The researchers scanned the subjects' brains while the
subjects looked at adult pornography. The fMRIs of pedophiles
150. As Professors Phelps and Thomas, preeminent researchers on
amygdalar function and behavior, note, "[alithough it is often exciting to
demonstrate a neural basis for a given behavior, it should not be surprising to
show that any behavior has an identifiable neural substrate." Id. at 754
(emphasis in original).
151. Mobbs et al., supra note 21, at 695.
152. Note that Professor Redding, who suggests that biological criminology
could be realized through this type of work (see Redding, supra note 3), is not
one of the authors of the article Law, Violence, and the Brain, supra note 21.
The connection between these claims is that of the author of this Article.
153. Martin Walter et al., Pedophilia Is Linked to Reduced Activation in
Hypothalamus and Lateral Prefrontal Cortex During Visual Erotic Stimulation,
62 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 698 (2007).
154. Id. at 698.
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during the experiment showed reduced activation of the
hypothalamus and prefrontal cortex "as compared to healthy
individuals when they were viewing sexually arousing pictures of
adults.

,5

5

The study's authors suggest that pedophilia may arise

from a defective neurological activation pattern (too little activity in
the hypothalamus).
Brain imaging studies ultimately may contribute to
understanding the origins and treatment of pedophilia. But an
imaging study like this one has less explanatory power than it at
first might seem, and little relevance for criminal law regimes aimed
at pedophiles. Essentially, the researchers here correlated sexual
arousal with activity in certain parts of the brain. This in itself is
an interesting result that helps confirm the role of certain parts of
the brain in arousal, but it does not reveal much, if anything, about
the causes of pedophilia-or whether people who do or do not show
such an activation pattern ever will abuse a child.
The results of this study would be expected by anyone who
subscribes to a materialist view of consciousness-that is, that all
our thoughts and emotions have some physical, detectable reality.
Subjects who said they were attracted to adults showed activity in
structures associated with arousal when they looked at erotic
pictures of adults. The subjects who said in advance of the scanning
that they were not attracted to adults did not show the same degree
of activity in the those areas. This study thus neatly demonstrates
that people show arousal when they see what turns them on and
that they don't when they don't. 15 7 This fits the materialist model
perfectly but does not support taking the leap to claims about the
causes of pedophilia or even, apart from causation, whether such
scans could be used to predict behavior in, e.g., decisions about the
release of an incarcerated pedophile.
Relatedly, this pedophilia study shows the degree to which
scans may not reveal brain pathology per se but simply neural
correlates of thoughts and behaviors that may be harmful,
antisocial, or illegal. If another experiment were run in which
normal adults failed to show brain arousal in response to child
pornographic images, one might see the same lack of hypothalamic
activation and concomitant absence of inhibitory pfc activity. Yet,
we would not define that as evidence of a brain dysfunction or speak
155. Rick Nauert, Brain Imaging of Sexual Predators, PSYCHCENTRAL,
http://psychcentral.com/news/2007/09/24lbrain-imaging-of-sexual-predators
/1325.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
156. Walter et al., supra note 153, at 699-70.
157. It is unclear why there would be any expectation that a group of
subjects would have any response (neurological or otherwise) to an erotic
category in which they have no interest. A group of shoe fetishists might show
arousal in response to a patent leather stiletto but not to a handbag; handbags
are the wrong fetish object. But one could not make the shoe fetishist a
handbag fetishist just by juicing up the degree of activity in the hypothalamus.
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of hypothalamic "deficits" in the subjects; for good reasons, we do not
consider lack of sexual attraction to children to be pathological.
Defining activation or lack of activation in particular parts of
the brain as "disorder" or "dysfunction" necessarily must start from
a normative position about the thing that is being described. And so
these definitions of biological dysfunction based on correlating brain
activation patterns with legally proscribed conduct have an element
of circularity. When we do this, we are reasoning from conclusions
about abnormality and back-fitting them into scanner patterns. But
we as yet have no basis on which to conclude that the activation
pattern causally produces the proscribed thing or represents a
medical pathology.
C. Tales of the Good Man Gone Bad-BrainInjury as Catalyst to
Crime
Finally, scholars who contend that violence should be
understood as a disease of localized brain dysfunction often point to
one-off cases of outlandish injury or unusual disease to try to show
that violence arises from disinhibition of the prefrontal cortex or
dysfunction in the amygdala. In these case histories, damage to
these areas causes previously law-abiding folk to transmogrify into
impulsive, violent criminals-by extension, they support the
implication that brain dysfunction is a major cause of criminal
violence, making the individual brain the right level at which to
explore and address such criminality.
The paradigmatic story of the relationship between frontal lobe
dysfunction and violence, repeated in nearly all legal and popular
science literature on the subject (and now to be repeated here), is
that of Phineas Gage.' 8 Phineas Gage was a law-abiding railway
worker who, in 1848, suffered a bizarre industrial accident: an
explosive charge meant to drive an iron tamping rod into the ground
backfired-and drove the rod through Gage's cheek-bone, behind his

158. See

WILLIAM

R.

UTrAL,

THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE

LIMITS OF

LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN 165 n.4 (calling the Gage story a

"mainstay of pop psychology"). Among many sources repeating the Gage story,
see, for example, Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words?
Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239, 244 (2007) (describing
the Phineas Gage case to show relationship between orbitofrontal damage and
violent behavior); Raymond J. Dolan, On the Neurology of Morals, 2 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 927, 927 (1999) (citing J.M. Harlow, Passage of an Iron Rod
Through the Head, 39 BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 389 (1848)) (discussing
Gage's treatment by his physician, Harlow); Redding, supra note 3, at 70-72
(discussing Gage case as exemplary of the relationship between orbitofrontal
damage and violence); Peggy Sasso, Implementing the Death Penalty: The Moral
Implications of Recent Advances in Neuropsychology, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 765,
792-94 (2007) (devoting a section of the article to the Gage case; describing it as
the seminal case on the relationship between damage to the prefrontal cortex
and violent and/or sexual disinhibition of conduct).
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159
eye socket, and out the top of his head.
In addition to the direct trauma to his skull and brain, he also
suffered major hemorrhaging and a brain abscess. 60 Amazingly,
Gage's injuries healed and he lived another thirteen years. Yet, he
went through a marked change: he became ill-tempered and
obstreperous. 6 ' For the rest of his life, Gage suffered a variety of
deficits and frequently was in minor trouble with the law. 6'
The modern paradigmatic story linking violent criminality to
brain disorder is the tragic story of Charles Whitman, an Eagle
Scout, scholarship student at the University of Texas, and by all
accounts loving husband and son, who murdered his wife, mother,
and fourteen students at the University of Texas on August 1,
1966.163 Whitman began to experience headaches and personality
changes about a year before his attacks; he believed that he was
suffering from a neurological problem and sought medical and lawenforcement help (including asking the police to arrest him earlier
in the day that he committed his murders; the police were obliged to
decline because Whitman had not yet committed any crime).'
A
post-mortem shortly after Whitman was shot by police showed a
large tumor compressing Whitman's amygdaloid nucleus. 6'
A few recent cases follow a similar pattern: a socially
respectable man-a teacher, a stock broker-suffers a brain injury
and morphs into a perpetrator of violence or sex crimes. 166 When the
brain injury heals (or the tumor is removed), the man returns to his
gentle and law-abiding ways.
While neuroscientists caution against reading too much into
such stories,'6 7 less cautious criminal law and neuroscience

159. Hanna Damasio et al., The Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the
Brain from the Skull of a Famous Patient,264 Sci. 1102, 1102-05 (1994).
160. See Randolph W. Evans, Brain Injury, 285 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 215, 215
(2001) (reviewing MALCOLM
PHINEAS GAGE (2000)).

MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME: STORIES OF

161. Damasio et al., supra note 159, at 1102.
162. Id.
163. See GOVERNOR'S COMM. & CONSULTANTS, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR:
CHARLES J. WHITMAN CATASTROPHE, MEDICAL ASPECTS (1966).

164.
165.
166.
Tumor

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Burns & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal
with Pedophilia Symptoms and Constructional Apraxia Signs, 60
ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY 437, 437-38 (2003) (describing case of forty-year old
man who engaged in uncharacteristic, unlawful sexual behavior incident to
developing tumor in the orbitofrontal cortex and whose behavior returned to
normal after removal of tumor); Becky Sheaves, The Freak Accident that Left
My Son Obsessed with Sex, DAILY MAIL, July 4, 2006, at 49 (describing the case
of Andrew Laing, who, incident to a concussive injury to the frontal lobe,
became physically and sexually aggressive).
167. VOLAVKA, supra note 1, at 78 (describing factors making such cases
difficult to extrapolate from, including: the multiple brain areas affected by the
accident or lesion, the lack of control subjects, and, most significantly, sampling
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scholarship makes a direct connection between Gage's accident and
Whitman's tumor to violent crime in general. The work Charles
16 8
Whitman: The Amygdala and Mass Murder typifies the genre.
The Gage and Whitman cases figured prominently in the recent
symposium on neuroscience and the criminal law at Baylor
University's center on Law, Brains, and Behavior. In the opening
remarks of the conference, Dr. David Eagleman argued that the
Whitman and Gage cases have important implications for criminal
notions of culpability and provide the groundwork for understanding
criminal violence as a medical problem arising from brain
disorder. 69 Similarly, major criminology textbooks use Whitman's
tumor as the starting point for a general
explanation of violent
70
crime as arising from brain dysfunction.
The role that these case histories play in the literature is to
show that criminal violence is a pathology-that it can be produced
by brain trauma and alleviated by brain correction. 171 The view
presented by this handful of brain trauma cases is that the most
relevant level at which to understand the general phenomenon of
criminal violence is internal to the individual-at the level of his or
her neurobiology or neurochemistry-and, specifically, can be
localized to the prefrontal cortex or amygdala. Finally, they present
the claim that the violent person is fundamentally "Other,"
essentially not-us, because he or she has a different (literally sick)
brain. Thus, in these cases, we see all three of the major tenets of
brain-behavior reductionism that historically have been manifest in
past episodes of brain sciences in the criminal law.

bias-people with brain injuries who become violent come to the attention of
law enforcement and violence researchers, whereas people with brain injuries
who are not so affected do not).
168. See RHAWN JOSEPH, Charles Whitman: The Amygdala and Mass
Murder, in NEUROPSYCHIATRY, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE
(2d ed. 1996), available at http://brainmind.com/Case5.html, cited in GENNARO
F. VITO ET AL., CRIMINOLOGY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND POLICY 109 (2d ed. 2007).

Professor Joseph also treats the relationship between Whitman's case, the
amygdalar complex, and aggression in RHAWN JOSEPH, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY,
NEUROPSYCHIATRY, & BEHAVIORAL NEUROLOGY 102-03 (1990), a standard

introductory neuroscience text book.
169. David M. Eagleman, Dir., Baylor Coll. of Medicine Initiative on Law,
Brains and Behavior, Introductory Remarks to Conference on Neuroscience and
Law at Baylor College of Medicine (May 23, 2008), available at
http://neuro.bcm.edu/eagleman/neurolawfNeuLawConferencePacket.pdf.
170. See, e.g., MARK M. LANIER & STuART HENRY, ESSENTIAL CRIMINOLOGY
101-02 (2004) (using Whitman story to introduce the concept of "biogovernance"
and prediction of violent crime); LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY 103 (2005)
(connecting Whitman's tumor to the "minimal brain dysfunction" explanation of
violent criminality); VITO ET AL., supra note 168, at 95-96.
171. Burns & Swerdlow, supra note 166, at 437-38.
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III. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES WITH CURRENT LAW AND THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF VIOLENCE

Bringing together anecdote and image, stories about the
localization of violence in the brain are almost irresistible. They
apparently have the most current and sexy science behind them, as
well as decades of animal and human trauma research. Yet, there is
"an enormous chasm" between what it is scientifically legitimate to
say about "the localization problem" and what has "been concluded
from well-intentioned, but inadequately reasoned research ....
While it may not at first seem legitimate to lump the law and
neuroscience of the new millennium with the science of lumps from
the 1800s, this Part will show that infirmities continue to dog efforts
to equate criminal violence with localized brain dysfunction-and
that, for reasons inherent to the ways in which localization
questions are posed, and the legal (not biological) content of
definitions of criminal violence, likely will continue to do so.
To evaluate the claims that criminal violence is the result of
brain dysfunction, this Part first will examine the current state of
research on the localization of basic and higher brain processes.
Starting with sensory-motor functions, it will show that, even for
these relatively simple functions, the localization enterprise runs
into problems. It then examines the state of research concerning the
localizability of violence to the amygdala and prefrontal cortex, and
some efforts to localize violence that have relied on celebrated brain
injury cases, like Phineas Gage and Charles Whitman.
As a final, formal barrier to localizing violence in the brain, this
Part will suggest that "violence," may be better understood as a
legal term and a psychological construct than a biological thing.
Legal institutions are essential to defining violence, as shown by the
ways that legal definitions of what conduct constitutes violence
change across place and time. Even outside of the legal domain, the
concept of violence may have no specific biological reality; rather, it
may be understood as a psychological construct-a term like
"intelligence" or "attachment" that covers a range of mental
activities and outward behaviors.
Each of these issues that present a barrier to the
straightforward localization of violence could be the subject of a
book; while it is beyond this Article to address each of these issues
comprehensively, this Part sketches them to inform the legal reader
of the active controversies surrounding the study of brain function
and violence. Furthermore, each of these questions goes back to the
touchstone issues introduced in the beginning of this Article:
whether the individual brain (or isolated parts of the brain) is the
most relevant level at which to examine problems of criminal
violence; whether it is possible to localize a heterogeneous set of
172.

UrfTAL, supra note 158, at 6.
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behaviors called "violence" to dysfunction in parts of the brain; and
whether people who engage in criminal violence may be biologically
different from people who do not.
A.

What We Know About Localization Generally
Theories of the localization of complex psychological
phenomena, like violence, start from the premise that the brain is
made up of specialized modules with distinct functions. Yet, the
localization of even very basic brain functions is not as precise as
generally is depicted in literature advocating for the localizable
nature of violence. Even sensory and motor components of the brain
are not neatly divided by function; this calls into question the
soundness of hypothesizing that violence is discretely localized.
The brain is clearly not an undifferentiated mass: it is composed
of various regions, which are visibly different both in their gross
anatomy and cell structure (cytoarchitecture). 7 1 Sensory and motor
functions, in particular, occupy relatively specialized regions of the
brain. 174 Some functional differences among these different regions
are well-established: the brain stem regulates the most basic
functions of the body's survival, such as breathing; the motor cortex,
as the name implies, relates to motion and locomotion; specific parts
of the brain also are involved in processing and interpreting sensory
input such as visual images, smell, and sound. Some areas involved
in uniquely human faculties, like speech, also have been identified:
Broca and Wernicke's regions, for example, play important
(although not exclusive) roles in producing speech, and lesions in
these areas can cause different kinds of aphasias.' 7' Neuroscientists
consider these sensory and motor functions to be the most easily
localized to particular regions of the brain.
However, even for these "simple" brain functions, many parts of
the brain are involved-and it is not yet known what their
contributions are or how they relate to each other. Indeed, it
appears that no one part of the brain is sufficient, in isolation, to
accomplish any function of a living being. 176
Furthermore,
individual variation in brain structure is enormous-particularly
among human beings-meaning that the locations in the brain that
are involved in one process in one person will not be identical in
another person.
Three beautiful and careful examples of neuroscience research
on sensory and motor systems-specifically, the auditory, visual,
and motor systems-illustrate the difficulties with localizing even
these more basic brain functions.
173. Id. at 11.
174. Id.
175.

MARK F. BEAR ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE: EXPLORING THE BRAIN 621-25 (3d

ed. 2006).
176. KAGAN, supra note 90, at 215.
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Processing sound, a basic sensory operation, involves several,
known regions of the brain. Yet, putting those components together
into "hearing" is not localized in any one part of the brain or even in
one general region. If a person is surprised by the sound of a
whistle, fMRI imaging shows that twenty-four distinct areas in the
brain become active.177 Prior to imaging studies, neuroscientists
would have assumed that many of these areas were not implicated
in sound processing at all.'7 Some of the regions may be associated
with surprise, sound-identification, and memory. (What does a
whistle mean to me?) Thus, a brain scan showing these twenty-four
areas lit up would not translate directly to any specific conclusion.
No conclusion can be drawn from such a scan about the necessity or
sufficiency of any of these regions to processing sound generally or
to the identification of a whistle specifically. Nor would it be
possible to read backward from the scan either that the person
heard a whistle or what a whistle noise means to him or her. That
multiple sites are activated in response to a simple auditory task
suggests that scientists and legal scholars "cannot assume that a
brain site is necessary for a psychological process just because it was
active during the process.' 7 9
This issue with sound processing represents the more general
problem of "necessary but not sufficient." Although "it is clearly
true that we can say of particular brain regions that they are
necessary for given behaviors (or their expression)," decades of
experiments show that "there is no region of the human brain
[including the amygdala or pfc] of which we can say that it is
sufficient for such functions."'8 °
The visual system presents greater complexity and
demonstrates a distinct problem. Neuroscientists working on how
the brain processes visual stimuli to create "seeing" have made
tremendous progress. Going back to the early 1990s, neuroscientists
have been able to discern and describe a series of feedback and feedforward systems between brain "modules" that contribute to the
overall gestalt of "seeing.""' These "modules" have been organized
by researchers into a hierarchical model that purports to show the
contributions that each one makes to seeing.8 2 And yet even here,
there may not be the degree of functional localization previously
assumed.
Because of the "basic properties of interconnected networks," it
appears likely that "complex systems like [the visual system] cannot
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180.

RICHARD C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OuR GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY,

AND HuMAN NATURE 145-46 (1984) (emphasis in original).

181. UTTAL, supra note 158, at 162 (emphasis in original) (citing Hilgetag et
al. (1996)).
182. Id.
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be organized into a unique hierarchical organizational chart."' 8
According to systems biologists, who work on the mathematics of
complex, nonlinear systems, there is "an in principle barrier to the
specification of a network hierarchy" like the brain processes that
interrelate to create "seeing," "no matter how many experiments may
be carried out.'8 4
While scans of auditory activity raise the
necessary/sufficient/incidental problem, the current understanding
of the visual system raises the issue that, in a complex networked
system, it may be formally (that is, mathematically) impossible to
determine the independent contributions of different components.
Work in the motor system highlights a third challenge to
localization individuality; the unique make-up of every person.
Cutting-edge experiments in neurorobotics (brain-robot interfaces)
demonstrate that brains are unique in important ways, even as to
simple motor functions, like moving one's arm. MacArthur-prize
winning neuroroboticist, Yoky Matsuoka, is showing that the motor
neurons of every person's brain are organized with important
differences that defy precise localization.' 85
Professor Matsuoka's work focuses on designing cybernetic
limbs that an amputee can control through thinking about moving
the missing limb.'
To do this, she introduces electrodes into the
specific neurons in the subject's brain responsible for activating arm
movement. 8 7
This research would sound as if it supports the
localization notion, at least for motor functions. And yet, this is not
the case. She explains:
A person's history determines which neurons control the
arm. Even in identical twins, the same neuron in one person
could activate the arm, but in the other twin, it could activate
the leg. It depends on what the person has touched, seen,
done, at critical points in his or her development.' 8
For this reason, it is not possible to identify a general "arm
movement location.' 89 This is not surprising, because "if our brains
were not individual, we could not be individuals." 90
These problems of localizing sensory-motor functions proliferate
as we move to the localization of cognitive functions. Sensory and
motor aspects of brain function are anchored to dimensions of time,
space, quality (e.g., hot, cold, wet), and intensity; the "further we
move from the sensory aspects of cognition ... the more difficult it
183. Id. at 162 (emphasis in original) (citing Hilgetag et al. (1996)).
184. Id.
185. Interview with Yoky Matsuoka, Professor, Univ. of Wash., in Santa
Barbara, Cal. (Feb. 16, 2007).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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becomes to find particular brain regions exclusively and uniquely
associated with a particular cognitive process."' 91 Neuroscientists
active in localization research concerning higher cognitive functions
confront the following problems:
* Cognitive functions activate broadly distributed regions of the
brain;
" Brain regions are complexly interconnected;
" Lesion experiments (or accidents) can confirm the
involvement but cannot confirm sufficiency of any region to
the function under study; and
" Human neuropsychological
92
idiosyncratic.'

and

experimental

data

are

These are but a few of the issues that "shadow[ed]" efforts to localize
complex cognitive functions "with serious and complex conceptual
troubles.' 92
B.

The Limits of Localizing Violence to the PFC and Amygdala
1.
Challenges Posed by Claims About PFC and Amygdalar
Function

Legal scholarship advocating for a primarily brain-based
understanding of violence hangs substantially on claims about the
pfc and the amygdala. Yet, different neuroscientists have come to
widely disparate conclusions about the functions of the pfc and the
amygdala, implicating them in diverse mental processes unrelated
to violence. This lack of consensus should give legal scholars pause
before adopting a view about the localization of violence to these
parts of the brain.
Looking at research on the pfc first: the prefrontal cortex is
without doubt one of the most intricate and sophisticated parts of
the brain. Indeed, there is hardly a higher-level cognitive process
that one researcher or another has not localized to the frontal lobes.
These include, among others:
" general intelligence;'

94

" problem solving;'95
96
" executive control;'
UTTAL, supra note 158, at 25.
192. Id. at 153. Uttal discusses each of these issues in depth. Id. at 153-66.
193. Id. at 26.
194. John Duncan, Attention, Intelligence, and the Frontal Lobes, in THE
191.

COGNITIvE NEUROSCIENCES 721, 721 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 1st ed. 1995)
[hereinafter COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES].

195.

ALEKSANDR ROMANOVICH LuRiA, HIGHER CORTICAL FUNCTIONS IN MAN

290 (1966).
196.

MICHAEL J. POSNER & MARcus E. RAICHLE, IMAGES OF MIND 32 (1997);
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197

" attention;
19 8
* decisionmaking;
"

semantic memory;199
200
perceptual analysis;

"

20 1
self-awareness; sense of self;

"

" "the creation and maintenance of explicit relational
representations that guide thought and action" ;202 and
20 3
won't."
"free
*
This list of functions, which is itself extremely broad, only
shows the tip of the proverbial iceberg: a literature review by several
neuroscientists of the functions imputed to the pfc produced a sevenpage list of different attributions. 204
The pfc may be involved in all of these activities, and others yet
to be determined. If so, what would decreased activation of a
person's pfc in a particular situation tell us? The answer is: nothing
unambiguously related to the disinhibition of violent conduct. Since
activity in the pfc could be related to some, all, or none of the
functions above, pfc activity cannot translate directly into impulse
control; lower activation does not mean that a person will act on a
Jennifer S. Beer et al., Frontal Lobe Contributions to Executive Control of
Cognitive and Social Behavior, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 1091, 1091

(Michael Gazzaniga ed., 3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter

COGNITIVE NUEROSCIENCES

3D].

197. Glyn W. Humphreys & Dana Samson, Attention and the FrontalLobes,
in COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 3D, supra note 196, at 607, 607.
198. NEUROBIOLOGY OF DECISION MAKING (A.R. Damasio et al. eds. 1996).
199. Anthony D. Wagner et al., Cognitive Control, Semantic Memory, and
Priming: Contributions from Prefrontal Cortex, in COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES
3D, supra note 196, at 709, 709.
200. Brenda Milner, Effects of Different Brain Lesions on Card Sorting: The
Role of the FrontalLobes, 9 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 90, 90 (1963).
201. C. Neil Macrae et al., A Self Less Ordinary: The Medial Prefrontal
Cortex and You, in COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 3D, supranote 196, at 1067, 1067.
202. Nina Robin & Keith J. Holyoak, Relational Complexity and the
Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex, in COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES, supra note

194, at 987, 987.
203. GAZZANIGA, supra note 11, at 95-96. "Free won't" is what Michael
Gazzaniga describes as the ability to stifle inappropriate thoughts, speech, or
action. Even if the pfc is the site of "free won't," it is unclear how or where the
brain determines what is or is not appropriate under the circumstances.
Gazzaniga's localization of "free won't" to the pfc is a wonderful companion to,
among others, Renee Descartes' localization of free will to the pineal gland. See,
e.g., PETER A. SCHOULS, DESCARTES AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 169 (1989).

In

Gazzaniga's schema, however, people are without such a construct as "free will";
rather, our thoughts and actions are totally determined ex ante by the structure
of our brains. GAZZANIGA, supra note 11, at 99.
204. UTTrAL, supra note 158, at 23-24 (describing and citing J. Grafman, A.
Partiot, and C. Hollnagel, Fables of the Prefrontal Cortex, 18 BEHAV. & BRAIN
SCI. 349 (1995)).
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violent urge, and higher activation does not mean that a person will
not act on a violent urge.
Similarly, numerous respected brain researchers question the
localization of fear to the amygdala, 2°5 and the leap from fearfulness
to violence, because "the amygdala can be activated by many events
that have no relation to fear."20

6

Pictures of food, the face of an old

friend, and couples hugging or kissing, among other images, provoke
amygdalar activity as long as the images are unexpected.2 7 If a
subject thinks he is in an experiment to identify playing cards, and
the researcher "shows you a picture of scrambled eggs, your
amygdala will light up."0 8 This is not because the subject is afraid
of or angry about scrambled eggs, but just because the picture is
unexpected. 20 9

This

group

of researchers

believes

that

"the

amygdala gets involved when there's news."210
Other prominent contemporary researchers, like Elizabeth
Phelps, depict the amygdala's role as mediating between emotion
and cognition, 211 and providing a basis for interpreting social
information.212 Still another view is that the amygdala plays a role
in visual memory.212
The functions of the amygdala could be (and are) the subject of
numerous books and scholarly articles. The purpose of this brief
discussion is to show the unreliability of claims that draw a linear
relationship between amygdalar activity and criminal violence.

205. These include, for example, Eliot Valenstein, William Uttal, Jerome

Kagan, and Stephan Chorover. See KAGAN, supra note 90, at 92 (describing
various types of stimuli that lead to activation of the amygdala).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Interview with Stephan L. Chorover, Dep't of Brain & Cognitive Scis.,
Mass. Inst. of Tech., in (Jan. 29, 2008).
209. Id.; see also KAGAN, supra note 90, at 86-87 ("The brain's first question
to every intrusion is: Was this event expected or unexpected? Less than twotenths of a second later it evaluates the specific meaning of the event and may
generate an emotion[al response].").
210. Chorover, supra note 208; see also KAGAN, supra note 90, at 86 (noting
that an equal degree of amygdalar activity occurs in response to images of
nudes as to angry or fear-provoking images). There could be a relationship
between how sensitive a person is to "news" and how fearful he or she is; the
two might be related at the level of how easily startled the person might be. A
person who is easily startled might be excessively fearful, and thus might be
prone to a greater degree of reactive violence-but that relationship is, on
current information, purely hypothetical.
211. Elizabeth A. Phelps, The Human Amygdala and Awareness:
Interactions Between Emotion and Cognition, in COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCEs 3D,
supra note 196, at 1005, 1005.
212. Ralph Adolphs, Processing of Emotional and Social Information by the
Human Amygdala, in COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 3D, supra note 196, at 1017.
213. Stephan L. Chorover, Violence: A Localizable Problem?, in BIOLOGY,
CRIME AND ETHIcs 255, 263 (Frank H. Marsh & Janet Katz eds., 1985).
HeinOnline -- 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 221 2009

222

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

2. Challenges in Correlating Scan Data and Subjective
Experience
A final challenge to the relationship between amygdalar or pfc
activation and propensity to violence is that substantial
discrepancies can exist between activation patterns in an fMRI and
what people subjectively self-report about their emotional state.
This raises the important question of what to believe-what a scan
indicates is going on in a person's head or what the person claims to
experience.
Interestingly, some studies find "little or no relation between
verbal reports of the intensity of anxiety or fear to pictures of angry
or fearful facial expressions and the amount of activity in the
amygdala." 214 The same is true when we move from fear or violence
to sex: measures of women's physiological response to pornography
and their self-reported experience of arousal (or, more typically, lack
215
thereof) correlate poorly."
The divergence between brain scan data and reported subjective
experience raises an important question about detecting and
regulating criminal violence. We might credit a woman's self-report
that she does not feel turned on by pornography even if biological
indicators show activity consistent with arousal-whether because
we believe she has no incentive to deceive or because it accords with
cultural expectations. But what about differences in self-reporting
versus scanning in an offender who is up for parole review? Would
we credit his claims not to have violent impulses, even though a
brain scan indicates reduced activation in the pfc or greater
activation in the limbic system relative to standard ranges?
This is a question with serious implications for some of the
proposed uses of fMRI data in criminal adjudications: how,
generally, could we assess a discrepancy between an fMRI and selfreported mental state, in light of the fact that there can be authentic
discrepancies between feelings and scans, and that both the subject
and the interpreter might be influenced by incentives and biases?
Given the tendency to credit as objective any data that appears in
the form216 of a picture and that is proffered by socially-respected
sources, 6 we well might privilege scans over self-reports-and be
214. Id. at 214 (citing T. Furmark et al., Amygdalar Activity during
Emotional Perception and Experience in Subjects with Social Phobia, 57
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 169S (2005); A.E. Guyer et al., Developmental
Differences in Attention Related to Amygdala Response to Emotional Facial
Expression, 57 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 8S (2005)); see also id. at 208 (describing
lack of correspondence between observed brain activity and self-reports of
experience).
215. See, e.g., Alessandra H. Rellini et al., The Relationship Between
Women's Subjective and Physiological Sexual Arousal, 42 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY

116, 123 (2005).
216. See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, FingerprintEvidence in an Age of
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mistaken in doing so.
3. Challengesof Extrapolatingfrom Animal Models
While researchers have implicated the pfc and amygdala in a
huge range of functions distinct from violence, the researchers who
advocate for a close violence-amygdala/pfc connection often show
empirical support for their claims through animal studies. These
animal studies provide what appear to be direct and compelling
evidence of the role of the amygdala, in particular, in causing
violence.
The raging bull and the wild monkeys reduced to
tameness through interference with their limbic systems--did they
not show an amazing absence of aggression?
In fact not. After initial reports that destruction of the
amygdala could render "wild" and "aggressive" animals "tame,"
further experiments showed that the animals likely were suffering
from a disruption to their visual memory. So, it was not the case
that the animals were without fear, but that they failed to recognize
what they were looking at.2 17 Thus, their normal fearful or
aggressive reaction disappeared because of interference with
contextual thinking, not because the amygdala is the storehouse of
fearful or aggressive impulses. Indeed, these animals still acted
with equal "aggressiveness" to threatening physical stimuli, like
being prodded.
Their "violent" responses to unpleasant touch but
apparent tameness toward everything else makes perfect sense as
an unintended consequence of disruption to visual memory: if you do
not know what a snake is, you might pick it up and be curious about
it. But if it bit you, you'd still throw it down-a "violent" reaction.
Beyond problems with experimental design that could permit
conflation of loss of visual recognition or partial paralysis with loss
of aggression, the use of animal models in studying human violence,
although productive and important, presents certain problems. As
discussed in Section III.B, most research on the relationship
between the amygdala and animal aggression has been conducted
on cats and rats. These experimental animals are cheap, easily
available, and share some important basic biology with people.
While researchers frequently extrapolate from animal models to
human models, brain and behavior are areas
.
1 where
.219 particular care
must be taken with transphyletic extrapolation.
It is worth
remarking on two features cats and rats share, and that humans do
DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 13 (2001) (discussing judicial and public
acceptance of fingerprinting); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The
History of HandwritingIdentificationEvidence and the Judicial Construction of
Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1727-29 (2001) (discussing judicial reception of
handwriting identification as a form of scientific evidence).
217. Chorover, supra note 213, at 263.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., T.C. Schneirla, Behavioral Development and Comparative
Psychology, 41 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 283, 285 (1966).
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not. First, cats and rats are territorial. Second, and also unlike
humans, they normally attack mice. Cats and rats have evolved
brain systems that enable them to be territorial and to attack
certain prey; the amygdala may play some role in these stereotypical
cat and rat behaviors that it does not play in the human being.22 °
Evolution is conservative-that is, it does not proliferate new
structures for new purposes but generally recruits existing
structures to new purposes. 221' In mammalian species, much brain
anatomy is the same and yet the functions facilitated by the same
brain structures differ between different genuses. This has been
shown to be true of the amygdala. Lesions to the amygdala disrupt
social communication in some primates, but not in humans.222
Conversely, lesions near certain language processing areas cause
people to have serious social deficits, but, in other primates, "social
communication ... is

unaffected."2 23

If

such

differences

in

amygdalar function exist between people and our closest primate
relatives, it is reasonable to ask whether the differences might not
be even greater between people and cats or rats.
Extrapolating freely from these experiments, though, in which
cats and rats are quicker to attack an intruder if their amygdalae
are stimulated and slower or indifferent if their amygdalae are
excised, researchers claim that the amygdala plays an important
role in human "defensive rage." They hypothesize that a person who
is often violent-who, for example, commits frequent acts of road
rage or domestic violence-has an overactive amygdala that
interprets innocuous stimuli as provocative insults. This kind of
excessively violent reaction, hypothesized to spring from amygdalar
overactivation, is then (rather circularly) claimed to show that
violence is a type of brain pathology.
The problems that can flow from very ambitious extrapolations
from animal models are evident in the connection of normal
aggression in cats with terrorism by people.224 From the literature
on "defensive rage" and "predatory aggression" in cats and rats,
some researchers have asserted (as noted in Part II.B) that unique
"neural topographies" might underlie specific human crimesincluding whether a person becomes a "political terrorist. 2 25 Even
holding aside the problems of cross-species extrapolation, the
related problem of meaning is obvious: terrorism is an inherently
220. For a classic statement of this principle, see Steven J. Gould & Richard
C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm:A
Critiqueof the AdaptationistProgramme,205 PRoc. ROYAL SoC' LONDON B 581,
594 (1979) (discussing phyletic and developmental constraints on evolutionary
innovation).
221. Id.
222. STEVEN E. HYMAN, 7 THE SCIENCE OF MENTAL HEALTH 126-27 (2001).
223. Id. at 123.
224. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
225. Mobbs et al., supra note 21, at 695.
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225

political concept that has a plethora of definitions and no
independent biological reality.226
There simply is no way to
extrapolate from activation patterns in animal brains to conclusions
about (putative) biological bases of human terrorism-much less
legal prescriptions for intervention in the same.
4. Issues with Extrapolationfrom Human Brain Injury Cases
If claims about the localization of violence based on animal
experiments are suspect, what about evidence directly from human
beings? Accidental brain injuries and brain diseases have produced
a host of illuminating scientific curiosities that sometimes have led
to medical breakthroughs.22 7 But the Gage and Whitman stories are
226. The Second Circuit (among other bodies) has concluded that there is no
generally-accepted definition of "terrorism":
We regrettably are no closer ... to an international consensus on the
definition of terrorism or even its proscription; the mere existence of
the phrase "state-sponsored terrorism" proves the absence of
agreement on basic terms among a large number of States that
terrorism violates public international law. Moreover, there continues
to be strenuous disagreement among States about what actions do or
do not constitute terrorism, nor have we shaken ourselves free of the
clich6 that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2003); see also id. 106-08
nn.41 & 42.
International treaties and domestic laws offer a plethora of conflicting
and controversial definitions of "terrorism." For a small sampling, for example,
6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(B) (2006) (defining terrorism by its effect on United States
interests); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006) (excluding aliens based on
participation in "terrorist activity" involving, inter alia,attacks on third parties
to influence the policy of any government); 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006) (defining
terrorism by motive); Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr.
22, 1998, reprinted in

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO THE PREVENTION
AND SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 152-73 (United Nations 2001);

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, Europ.
T.S. 90; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970). Scholars have their own definitions as well.
See, e.g., ALEX P. SCHMID & ALBERT J. JONGMAN, POLITIcAL TERRORISM 1-2
(1988) ("Terrorism is a method of combat in which.., symbolic victims serve as
an instrumental target of violence.").
227. KENNETH
M.
HEILMAN
& EDWARD VALENSTEIN,
CLINICAL
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 15 (2003) (describing effect of a lesion in Broca's area to
speech and the relationship between other lesions and distinctive speech
problems). Brain disease is more likely to lead to greater understanding of the
normal function of the affected portion of the brain where the disease afflicts
enough people, in a sufficiently consistent way, that it is possible to generalize
about the impact of damage of a particular kind to a particular part of the
brain. See, e.g., R. Adolphs et al., Impaired Recognition of Emotion in Facial
Expressions Following Bilateral Damage to the Human Amygdala, 372 NATURE
669 (1994); J.M. Gray et al., Impaired Recognition of Disgust in Huntington's

Disease Gene Carriers, 120 BRAIN 2029 (1997); Reiner Sprengelmeyer et al.,
Recognition of FacialExpressions: Selective Impairment of Specific Emotions in
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canards that contribute very little to understanding criminal
violence. Although brain injuries can be catastrophic, there is no
reliable relationship between pfc damage and violent or impulsive
behavior. While in some cases "relatively large volumes of brain can
be 'disconnected' without much obvious consequence," in other cases
extremely small traumas of a few millimeters can "have devastating
effects."228 Brain injury continues to puzzle, and throws more
caution than light on simplistic localization arguments about the
functioning of intact brains.2 9
For these reasons, it is "surprising[ ]" that "a few scientists"
have started to use pfc activity levels "as a referent for moral feeling
or judgment."23° While it is true that certain "[pisychopaths who are
shown an aggressive picture ... display less activation" in the pfc

than neurotypical people, the reverse is not true: "most adults with
damage to, or compromise of, the orbitofrontal prefrontal cortex
never commit a serious crime, whereas most who lie, cheat, and
steal have perfectly intact brains." 23'

This is not to say that brain

trauma or disease could not produce dramatic personality changes;
it could. The questions of how the brain reroutes around and
compensates for injuries, and how it continues to change throughout
a person's life, form a whole field of inquiry in their own right. The
limited point here is just that isolated stories like those of Gage and
Whitman may have less to say than is claimed about them or than
at first it may appear.
C.

Violence as a Legal Term and Psychological Construct
In order for violence to be localizable to activity in specific parts
of the brain, or to particular brain dysfunctions, it must designate a
coherent or homogenous thing. "Violence," however, designates a
huge range of individual, group, and even national behavior. 2
What the law recognizes as violence changes greatly over time and
place. Violence takes its meaning from the law, social• norms,
and
233
the particular context in which the violent acts take place.
Two relatively recent changes in the criminal law illustrate the
legally-contingent nature of what a society calls "violence": the
creation of the category of domestic violence and the proscription of
Huntington's Disease,

14 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 839, 839-40 (1997)
(describing deficits in Huntington's patients with lesions to same portion of
brain).
228. LEWONTIN ET AL., supra note 180, at 190.
229. Chorover, supra note 213, at 263 ("Brain lesions, whether the results of
operations or accidents in humans, or in controlled animal experiments, have
continued to produce puzzles and paradoxes.").
230. KAGAN, supra note 90, at 130.
231. Id.
232. LEWONTIN ET AL., supra note 180, at 91.
233. Elizabeth A. Stanko, Introduction to THE MEANINGS OF VIOLENCE 2-3
(Elizabeth A. Stanko ed., 2003).
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one kind of sexual violence through the elimination of the marital
rape exception. Prior to the latter quarter of the twentieth century,
victims of abuse by intimates might have identified their abusers'
conduct as violent-but legal culture did not. Until Pennsylvania
passed its landmark Protection from Abuse Act in 1977, domestic
violence• . was
largely unrecognized and not separately legally
231
actionable.
With the stroke of a legislator's pen, acts that
previously did not rate the designation "criminal violence" suddenly
became legally defined as such.
The marital rape exception tells the same story as to sexual
violence in the home. Until relatively recently, state courts across
the United States presumed that a husband had a right to sex at
any time within marriage, regardless of the wife's actual consent.235
After much legal and social contestation, this aspect of what
previously was a conjugal right became redefined as marital rape; a
husband who was exercising his legally-sanctioned rights one day
became the perpetrator of criminal sexual violence the next. S• This
231
was a change in the law, not a change in perpetrators' brains.3
Today, in much of Asia and the Middle East, the marital rape
exception endures;2 37 thus, the same conduct that is "criminal
violence" in one culture is not considered "violence" at all under the
laws and mores of another. This small example illustrates that
what counts as violence depends substantially on who gets to define
it.
As discussed above, social unrest incident to the struggle for
civil rights was a major impetus in the 1960s for calls for widespread lobotomy. Drs. Sweet, Mark, and Ervin explicitly linked
their localization theory of violence to neurobiological differences in
race rioters: because some African-Americans rioted and others did
not, they reasoned, the only explanation for this distinction must lie
outside the slum conditions in which both rioters and nonrioters
lived. Rather, there must be a "brain proneness to violence"
234. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 109 (2003) (describing history of enactment of anti-domestic
violence legislation in the United States).
235. Rebecca M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape
Exemption, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941 (1995) (providing a history of the
challenges to, and defeat of, marital rape exceptions in the United States). For
a comprehensive treatment of this subject, see DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN
MARRIAGE (1982).

236. Except to the extent that internalized norms might alter brain
structure or function, on a materialist view of thought. So, a change in norms
might cause a change in brain biology-but that is not the causal direction we
find in arguments about the neurobiology of violence.
237.

AIHWA ONG, NEOLIBERALISM AS EXCEPTION: MUTATIONS IN CITIZENSHIP

49-50 (2006) (discussing the marital rape exception under
Islamic law and noting that many Asian legal scholars view the marital rape
exception as an unacceptable "Western import"; the views of Asian and Muslim
women on this subject, however, are not reported).
AND SOVEREIGNTY
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amongst those who rioted.238
Surely, the acts of rioters count as "violence" under any
customary definition. However, Drs. Mark and Ervin notably failed
to consider that mass injustices perpetrated by whites against
African-Americans also might constitute "violence."
No
contemporary proposals were advanced to, for example, conduct
neurobiological studies of white supremacist gangs or enthusiastic
Southern sheriffs to determine the brain disorders underlying their
predispositions to violence. Nor were any proposals for "therapeutic
lobotomy" or "sedative neurosurgery" advanced for dealing with the
then-widespread problem of white violence. Thus, while the laws at
the time proscribed both rioting and the acts of individual violence
by whites against blacks, only the conduct of one group appeared
problematic; thus we see that who is described as violent, as well as
what is described as violence, also depends on who is making the
judgments.
Moving outside of legal definitions, violence may be understood
23 9
better as a psychological construct than as a biological fact.
Psychological constructs describe general features observed across
people, like "intelligence" or "memory,"24 that are united by
functional similarities, or family resemblances, more than by a
common biology.24 ' Psychologists do not consider these to be real
"things" that can be measured in the same way as, for example,
height, although they can be measured functionally. 42 Psychological
constructs may be valuable, and may map well onto behavior; yet, it
is well recognized that they may have no relationship to a particular
238. Mark et al., supra note 102, at 217.
239. A psychological construct "is a theoretical idea developed to explain and
to organize some aspects of existing knowledge." It is a work of informed
scientific imagination understood from its network of relationships. AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS

29-30 (1974).
240. James R.P. Ogloff & Kevin S. Douglas, Psychological Assessment in
Forensic Settings, in 10 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY, 346, 355 (John R. Graham &
Jack A. Naglieri eds., 2003).
241. The relationship between psychological constructs, on the one hand,
and physical reality on the other, goes to the heart of profound issues in fields
ranging from cognitive psychology and neuroscience to linguistics and
philosophy. See, for example, HILARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND REALITY 7
(1988) (challenging Noam Chomsky's notion of mental modules). Putnam fires
a shot over the bow at the notion that there is a correspondence between either
mental states or psychological representations, and physical reality, stating
that there is a "general tendency in the history of thought ... to think of
concepts as scientifically describable ('psychologically real') entities in the mind
or brain. And it is this entire tendency that, I shall argue, is misguided." Id.
242. STEVEN J. OSTERLIND, CONSTRUCTING TEST ITEMS: MULTIPLE-CHOICE,
CONSTRUCTED-RESPONSE, PERFORMANCE, AND OTHER FORMATS 36 (2d ed. 1998);

see also KAGAN, supra note 90, at 42 (noting that psychological constructs "are
theoretical inventions intended to explain behavior. They are not 'things in the
brain'").
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underlying biology at all.243
IV. NORMS AND NEURONS: TOWARD INTEGRATING BRAIN-LEVEL AND
SOCIAL-LEVEL APPROACHES IN CRIMINAL LAW
At the start of this Article, I argued that similar beliefs have
been at work in each of the past major criminal law and
neuroscience movements and inform some of the current work that
identifies the commission of violent offenses as emerging from brainbased pathology. This Part will unite past and current movements
by exploring their common themes. It will then offer examples of
how neuroscience could contribute to legal understandings of the
causes of violent acts; these examples suggest an approach to
incorporating neuroscience into criminal law that is less ambitious
than a total brain-based theory of violence-but that may, for that
very reason, prove more productive. Scholars like Elizabeth Phelps
and Dame Susan Greenfield (among many others) examine the ways
that beliefs and identities are formed on a neurological level; how
people differentiate in-groups and out-groups; and how people use
different kinds of emotions, like disgust, in making judgments about
others. This work could inform approaches to the design of legal
institutions to enhance prosocial behavior and reduce violent
conflict, but it would not promise to provide clear answers "in the
brain" for why violence happens.
The ideas at the end of this section are meant to be suggestive,
not exhaustive, as there are many promising areas of collaboration,
including those yet to be devised.
A.

Uniting the Three Tenets

Understanding criminal violence primarily as brain-based rests
on the notion that personal, social, and cultural phenomena-from
an individual's actions to the way markets function-not only can be
explained, but are caused and determined, by the make-up of the
most basic physical components of a system. This is reductive
materialism, 24 a way of thinking that aims to explain higher-level
243. The definition of a "psychological representation" is itself the subject of
extensive dispute in the fields of psychology, linguistics, and philosophy. See,
e.g., Gregory McCulloch, Mental Representation and Mental Presentation, in
LOGIC, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE 22, 22-24 (Anthony O'Hear ed., 2002)
(describing definitions of a "psychological representation" across several
intellectual disciplines).
244. Calling this approach reductive is no slur-a majority of neuroscientists
share a commitment to reductive materialism. Indeed, Michael Gazzaniga, a
preeminent neuroscientist who coined the phrase "cognitive neuroscience,"
identifies reductionism (or reductive materialism) as the dominant mode of
inquiry in this field and one with great investigatory and explanatory power.
See Snead, supra note 10, at 1278 (quoting Michael S. Gazzaniga & Megan S.
Steven, Free Will in the Twenty-first Century: A Discussion of Neuroscience and
the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW (Brent Garland ed., 2004)).
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phenomena completely in terms of their lower-level components; it
entails the belief that higher-level phenomena also are completely
caused by lower-level phenomena.2 45 Thus, according to a reductive
materialist view of the brain ("neuropsychological reductionism" or
neuroreductionism 2 46 ), all "human thought and behavior" is best
understood by examining "physical processes taking place inside the
brain .. ,247

Describing this school of thought, Professor Owen Jones writes:
[AIll choices emerge from the human nervous system.... The
[nervous] system is composed of molecules, in turn composed
of atoms, and it is driven by chemical reactions and electrical
circuits. The nervous system and its brain are therefore part
of a material world in which present events are caused by
prior events, extending back to the beginning of time and
matter.24

Those who subscribe to the strong reductionist position believe
(or would agree) that the Big Bang contained within it all the
information that has determined everything that has come afterthat "the entire history of the stars [and] ...the history of life as
well" was "immanent in that millionth of a second when the
universe began,"249 including, among other things (or among
everything) the emergence of life on earth, the evolution of human
kind, and whether a particular person would commit a violent
criminal offense. This is because "all choices emerge" from an
unbroken chain of causation stretching back to "the beginning of
time."2 0 Translating this view to the relationship between brain,
behavior, and society to understanding criminal violence leads to an
245. Id. at 1277 n.59 (citing PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND, BRAIN-WISE:
20-21 (2002) ("[A] reduction has been achieved

STUDIES IN NEUROPHILOSOPHY

when the causal powers of the macrophenomenon are explained as a function of
the physical structure and causal powers of the microphenomenon.")).
246. Chorover, supra note 213, at 266.
247. Id.; see also, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOsOPHY 599-602

(Robert Audi ed., 1995) (defining materialism as the premise that only physical
things exist and therefore that all phenomena must be explained in terms of
material causes). For a fine comment exploring the implications of reductive
materialism in criminal law, see Andrew E. Lelling, Comment, Eliminative
Materialism, Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471
(1993).

248. Jones, supra note 123, at 93 (emphasis added).
249. RICHARD LEWONTIN & RICHARD LEVINS, BIOLOGY UNDER THE INFLUENCE:
DIALECTICAL ESSAYS ON ECOLOGY, AGRICULTURAL, AND HEALTH 16 (2007)
(critiquing the strong reductionist position).
250. Jones, supra note 123, at 93; cf. Patricia Smith Churchland, Moral
Decision-Making and the Brain, in NEUROETHICS, supra note 19, at 3, 5-6
(describing the brain as a causal machine but noting that, due to its nature as a
"complex... dynamical system," it may defy prediction; arguing that
unpredictability does not arise because activity in the brain exists outside of
physical causes but because causation is not simple in systems of this type).
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individualistic approach in which the individual brain or even
subregions of the brain are taken as the basic unit of analysis. 25'
Viewing criminality as the result of brain dysfunction-of
biological difference between lawbreakers and nonlawbreakersdovetails with the concept of alterity. "Alterity" is the construction
of community through the identification and exclusion of the
"Other."252

Criminal law, a strongly normative discipline, is

understood to reinforce community ideals by defining and excluding
that which threatens the community, whether the threat is
practical, normative, or both; 25 thus alterity is a significant concept
within criminal law. The relationship between criminal law and
alterity is at best an ambivalent one, however, because it is an
aspiration (and perhaps a conceit) of liberalism that we judge the act
and not the actor. 254 Accordingly, the normative criminal law in the
liberal state is both prone to alterity and on its guard against it.
The idea of the biological "Other," the "born criminal," satisfies the
urge to alterize the criminal but also raises questions about the
propriety-and relevance-of doing so in a system that at least aims
to judge acts and not statuses.
Neuroscience approaches to legal issues can (but need not) feed
into the concept of alterity in criminal law by defining people who
commit crimes as biologically different. Alterity in past and current
claims about violent offenders is not subtle. For Cesare Lombroso,
the brain of the criminal resembled that of the "rat" or the "lower
carnivore., 255 Psychointerventionalists of the mid-twentieth century

compared violence in people to the behaviors of the "raging bull" or

251. Individualism is used here in the sense of taking the individual as
ontologically prior to the social ("methodological individualism"). See, e.g., LARS
UDEHN, METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM: BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND MEANING

320-21 (2001). it is not used in the more general sense of "the assertion of one's
own will or personality." See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 656 (2d ed. 1991);
see also Chorover, supra note 213, at 264 (arguing that the
psychointernventionalists, like lobotomists, made the error of looking at
individual brains in isolation for the solutions to social problems).
252. Raymond Corbey & Joep Leerssen, Studying Alterity: Backgrounds and
Perspectives, in ALTERITY, IDENTITY, IMAGE iv (Raymond Corbey & Joep Leerssen
eds., 1991) (describing alterity and its role in societies' self-definition).
253. Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the
Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1839, 1840 (2000) ("[T]he extent of criminal law's moral authority
determines the extent of its ability to shape community norms and to influence
people's conduct through normative forces.").
254. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV.
413, 414-15 (1999).
255. See infra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of Lombroso's work. For a
comprehensive treatment of scientific racism, focusing particularly on brain
difference, see generally Gould, supra note 54. For another excellent critique of
past scientific racism by a leading biologist of violence, see DEBRA NIEHOFF, THE
BIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 2-20 (1999).
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the "predatory and vicious lynx" and "wolverine."2 6 The racial
dimension present in past episodes also speaks to the notion of the
violent person as the biological "Other." As discussed above, Drs.
Mark, Ervin, and Sweet explicitly linked their localization theory of
violence-and their recommendation of mass lobotomy-to putative
neurobiological differences in race rioters. The absence of any
consideration of the neurobiology of white violence toward AfricanAmericans suggests that they ex ante viewed their subjects (however
subconsciously) as Other.
The express and implied racism of earlier criminal law-brain
science movements emphatically is not present in current work in
the field. Scholars are extremely careful to distinguish their work
from the race-based premises and applications of brain sciences in
criminal law in past eras.257 Furthermore, none of the current work
focuses on racial difference, nor have any scholars differentially
focused on any racial groups. Absent the racial dimension, however,
alterity remains implicit in current claims that locate criminal
violence in brain difference. If behavior is determined by brain
structure and function (holding aside for the moment the causes and
fixity of such difference), and a person behaves in ways that deviate
from the norm, then that difference must be biological difference;
this makes the offender the "Other."
In constructing violence as a biological feature of violent
offenders, historical and some modern localization stories offer a
comforting answer to the problem of evil: there are no evil people,
just dysfunctional brains. One of the most common reactions to
horrific acts of violence is to ask how a person (or people) could do
such a thing. Extreme acts of violence are, most of the time and to
most people, incomprehensible. Such acts pose hard questions.
Perhaps the only easy or comforting answer is that such acts are the
product of real, literal sickness: "Crime is ...

[is] a

disease."259

pathological";2 "8 "Crime

256. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 77, at 29. Sampling here just some of the
work summarized and relied upon by Mark and Ervin, id. at 38-46: B.N.
Brunnell et al., Septal Lesions and Aggressiveness in the Cotton Rat, Sigmodon
Hispidus, 6 PSYCHONEUROLOGICAL SCI. 443 (1966); M. David Egger & John P.
Flynn, Effects of Electrical Stimulation of the Amygdala on Hypothamically
Elicited Attack Behavior in Cats, 26 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 705 (1963); H. Ursin
& B. Kaada, Functional Localization within the Amygdaloid Complex in the
Cat, 12 EEG CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1 (1960); Lawrence Weiskrantz,
Behavioral Changes Associated with Ablation of the Amygdaloid Complex in
Monkeys, 49 J. COMP. PHYSIOLOGY PSYCHOL. 381 (1956).
257. VOLAVKA, supra note 1, at xi-xiv. Volavka himself was imprisoned in a
Nazi camp as a child and has written eloquently about the falsity and dangers
of racial stereotypes, biological and otherwise. Id. at vii.
258. MCCORMICK, supra note 74, at 560.
259. Kirchmeier, supra note 4, at 634.
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B. Turning the Premises Around: Toward IntegratingNorms
and Neurons
The criminal law's resurgent attention to neuroscience offers an
opportunity for collaboration that does not recapitulate past
problems rooted in determinism and alterity. While accepting that
all behavior is produced by the brainy, work of the kind discussed
here explores how the criminal law could use this knowledge at
levels ranging from the individual to the general, and to clarify the
contributions of both pathology and normalcy to the commission of
violent offenses. Two areas of inquiry, below, on intragroupintergroup biases and on the role of emotions in decision-making,
suggest that neuroscience research can help illuminate the presence
of basic neural systems that become socially shaped; this suggests
that the law may not be able to eradicate the sometimes dangerous
predispositions that arise from these systems but could leverage
them in more useful ways. This section closes with some suggested
avenues for future research.
1.

In-Groups and Out-Groups, Identity, and Violence

"Can we all get along?"261 Rodney King uttered this famous plea

when riots rocked Los Angeles after an all-white jury acquitted
police officers of severely beating Mr. King. Mr. King's question is a
perennial one, as is the problem of intergroup violence and
subjugation. Recent cognitive neuroscience studies suggest that
people are primed to make self-other distinctions 26 2-but that who
we see as "self' and who we see as "other" are strongly socially
influenced 263 as well as subject to change through experience and
learning.2
260. Reflexes still may be observed in the absence of any brain functioning
other than the brain stem, as in infants born with anencephaly; reflexes,
though, are not "behavior." See, e.g., C.P. PANTELIADIS & B.T. DARRAS,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY 367 (2000) (describing reflexes in

anencephalic infants).
261. Rodney King, Statement on Los Angeles Riots (May 1, 1992),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMfr2CgIPhg (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
262. James K. Rilling et al., Social Cognitive Neural Networks During InGroup and Out-Group Interactions,41 NEUROIMAGE 1447, 1447-48 (2008).
263. Li Zhang et al., In Search of the Chinese Self An fMRI Study, 49 ScI.
CHINA: SERIES C. LIFE Sci. 89, 89-90 (2006) (describing brain regions involved in
reflection on self, related other (mother), and abstract other (cartoon
character)).
264. See, e.g., Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial
Prejudice:Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16
PSYCHOL. Sci. 56, 56-57 (2005) (discussing results of fMRI study showing that
in-group/out-group perception is changed based on task and finding that race
can be salient in the default condition, but subjects will quickly reorganize ingroup/out-group based on instructions to attend to age, gender, or the presence
of differently-colored dots on photos of strangers' faces).
HeinOnline -- 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 233 2009

234

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

Because much violence involves intergroup conflict, as well as
conflict between individuals of perceived different groups, scholars
in criminal law may look to the developing neurobiological literature
on intragroup-intergroup identification, belief, and identity to
reduce destructive group bias and conflict.265 It is unlikely that
there are distinct brain-based predispositions or pathologies
subserving all the violent offenses from hate crimes to gang behavior
to terrorism to ethnic and political violence; yet, self-other and
intragroup-intergroup distinctions may play some role in all of
them. Functional imaging studies show that fear conditioning is
easier to establish and harder to erase relative to members of the
"other" group than to one's own group: subjects in the lab learn
positive associations faster and negative associations more slowly as
to members of their own groups; conversely, negative views of the
members of the "other" group persist much longer than toward
members of one's own group, even in light of contrary information. 266
This work on the difference between us-them perception raises
the question of how these beliefs come to be incorporated physically
by the subject 6 7 -and how these kinds of beliefs may relate to acts of
violence. Examining how beliefs come to be laid down in the brain,
researchers are finding that ideas with a belief-based component are
both easier to remember and harder to overcome than ideas
communicated through fact or logic.

268

Everyone has experienced

that strong emotion ("high arousal") makes a much stronger mark in
one's mind than dry facts; this metaphorical sense appears to be
literally true in fMRI studies of belief and memory formation.26 9
One's basic beliefs appear to become encoded into the brain through
a combination of high-arousal experiences and through repetition.
Institutionalized religious practices incorporate both of these
features, with emotional stories and ceremonies (high arousal), and
prayers, memorization of texts or creeds, and chanting (high
repetition).
265. While work on the neuroscience of group bias has not yet been applied
within criminal law scholarship, it has been applied to general questions of
institutional design, see, for example, Goodenough, supra note 18, and Hill &
O'Hara, supra note 16.
266. Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race
Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729,
730-31 (2000).
267. Damian Stanley et al., The Neural Basis of Implicit Attitudes, 17
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 164, 165 (2008) (discussing an fMRI
imaging study of same).
268. Sam Harris et al., Functional Neuroimaging of Belief, Disbelief, and
Uncertainty, 63 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 141 (2008); Oliver Sacks & Joy Hirsch,
Editorial, A Neurology of Belief, 63 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 129 (2008).
269. Audio recording: Dame Susan Greenfield, Remarks on the Science of
Terrorism, Australian Science Media Centre (Aug. 21, 2006), available at
www.aussmc.org/The-Science of Terrorism.php.
270. Sacks & Hirsch, supra note 268.
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There may be a relationship, Dame Susan Greenfield
speculates, between the degree of individualism of a person's
identity and the degree of autonomic arousal and aversion the
person will feel in response to threats or risks to self.27'

A person

with a more collective identity may perceive threats or insults to the
group more like a threat to the self; conversely, he or she may
perceive a risk to the self that does not implicate the group as less
comparatively alarming or aversive.272 If religion were used to
inculcate collective-focused beliefs, through high-arousal experiences
and repetition, such beliefs would be difficult to dislodge through
appeals to fact, logic, or self-interest. This work does not suggest
that some cultural beliefs predispose any person to violence. But it
may suggest that people from cultures that promote group
identification will perceive threats or slights to the culture as if they
were directed at the individual; they also may be more willing to
273
take individual risks on behalf of the cultural group.
Greenfield's description of how neural processes mediate and
are mediated by cultural processes may not provide an explanation
for why some people become suicide-terrorists: not only does she
recognize the attenuated relationship between belief and identity,
and identity and risk perception, but also the large leap from
reduced individual risk aversion to committing self-destructive
violence. Furthermore, her remarks are speculative and require
much additional investigation. But her approach offers a plausible
account of why suicide-terrorism, or other self-destructive ways of
perpetrating group or political violence, like the Japanese tokubetsu
k6geki tai (kamikaze), appear more commonly in cultures that
expressly value strong religious or national identification.
This way of relating neuroscientific findings to individual
violent crimes notably does not conform to the three themes or
tenets that have run through prior criminal law-brain science
movements: it does not posit any putative violence-related brain
dysfunction in the perpetrator; does not view violence as a thing
that can be localized to a specific part of the brain; and, although it
explores how cultural differences may relate to individual behavior,
does not construe the perpetrator of a violent act as essentially
different from people who do not commit such acts. Furthermore,
under this view, it would not be possible to put an individual into a
scanner, identify an under- or over-active brain region, and then use
such a scan as a prediction technique of future violent conduct in the
pre- or post-conviction setting. Rather, it construes violence of a
specific type as the end of an array of interactions between brain,
culture, and political context, and explores how those factors relate
271. Greenfield, supra note 269.
272. Id.
273. Id. (explaining how, in Greenfield's more colorful
"individual[s] can self-destruct and it does not matter").
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to individual responses to risk to the self; in other words, such
studies on belief formation show how neurons and norms literally
come together.
2. A Few More Avenues
There are myriad ways neuroscience could contribute to
criminal law, ranging from general models of emotion and behavior
to specific analyses of particular punishments and rehabilitation
strategies.
In such a new and developing field, it would be
impossible (as well as an act of hubris) to try to predict all of the
potential avenues of research. A few of these future avenues could
include work on preventing criminal behavior, designing individual
sentences and general penalties in a more informed manner, and
rehabilitating offenders.
As a threshold matter, it could be useful to investigate the
nonpathological pathways that lead to violence, like confinement
and frustration. The existence of "air rage" and "road rage" suggest
that there are situations or structures that predictably stress people
beyond their capacity for self-control.
If we were to better
understand the general conditions that provoke aggression, we
might be able to design systems that help minimize such triggers.
This moves us from the notion of violence-as-pathology to a more
general understanding of our capacity for violence under given
conditions.
Neuroimaging could perhaps help describe what types of
behaviors or beliefs that lead to violence are more readily
changeable or malleable. When experimental psychologists teach an
animal a conditioned response-like the expectation of a reward in
response to a tone-and then teach the animal to "unlearn" that
response, they call it "extinguishing" the response. 21'
What
neurobiological factors make certain behaviors or beliefs easier or
harder to "extinguish"? And how would that vary based on
individual factors, like motivation? Conversely, there may be some
behaviors that may be particularly resistant to change. In both
cases, such information might have predictive value as to recidivism
as well as suggest which offenders would benefit most from
rehabilitation strategies.
Another area may be juvenile justice. As the landmark decision
in Roper v. Simmons275 recently acknowledged in holding
unconstitutional the death penalty for offenders who committed
their offenses as juveniles,7 6 research shows that different parts of
the brain mature at different ages. 277 While th
the Court focused on the
274. Nestor A. Schmajuk, Conditioning,in THE HANDBOOK OF BRAIN THEORY
256, 256-58 (Michael A. Arbib ed., 2d ed. 2003)
(describing conditioned responses and their extinguishment).
275. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
276. Id. at 568.
277. Id. at 574.
AND NEURAL NETWORKS
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"diminished culpability of juveniles,"278 this research also raises the
question of whether juveniles are more amenable to rehabilitation
than adults. If so, that would suggest a reconsideration of the
punitive emphasis in much of the juvenile system. Furthermore, it
might be possible to model effects of punishment on juveniles on a
neurological level: what are the effects on developing brains of being
exposed to conditions of punishment, and do those differ from effects
on adult brains?
The neurological impact of conditions of confinement could be
investigated as well. It is well known observationally that extended
affects
mental
health. 9
confinement
seriously
solitary
Hypothetically, if it could be determined that extended solitary
confinement causes neurological changes known to be associated
with severe stress and with certain mental illnesses, like cell death
in the hippocampus, that might provide grounds to set limits on
certain conditions of confinement. This would move out of research
on the causes of violence by individuals, but would consider whether
the state does undue violence through methods of punishment.
CONCLUSION

Albert Einstein wrote that the best models should be "as simple
as possible, but no simpler."28 0 The claim that the criminal law can

understand violence principally as emerging from localized brain
dysfunction in people who are neurobiologically distinct is simpler
The brain is a physical manifestation of the
than possible.
interaction between biology and society; our increasing
understanding of its plasticity and function may lead us to conclude
that it is impossible to fix a biological nature apart from a social
existence. A "more unified picture of brain-behavior relationships
and [ofi the nature of human problems" would integrate "the
overlapping aspects of existence represented by the organization of
the brain, the individual, and the society."281 The challenge in this

time period, in this particular episode of the affair between criminal
law and neuroscience, is to use neuroscience not to craft attractive
simplifications but to shed a measure of light on complex and
multifaceted realities.

278. Id.at 571.
279. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL' 325, 327 (2006); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in
Long-Term Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
124, 130-32 (2003) (citing forty-six studies describing psychiatric and
physiological effects of extended solitary confinement, including hallucinations
and hypertension).
280. Quoted in Brian Greene, "That Famous Equation and You," in E =
EINSTEIN: His LIFE, His THOUGHT AND His INFLUENCE ON OUR CULTURE 287, 292

(Donald Goldsmith & Marcia Bartusiak eds., 2006).
281. Chorover, supra note 213, at 264-65.
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